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Abstract. We study stochastic two-player turn-based games in which
the objective of one player is to ensure several infinite-horizon total re-
ward objectives, while the other player attempts to spoil at least one of
the objectives. The games have previously been shown not to be deter-
mined, and an approximation algorithm for computing a Pareto curve
has been given. The major drawback of the existing algorithm is that it
needs to compute Pareto curves for finite horizon objectives (for increas-
ing length of the horizon), and the size of these Pareto curves can grow
unboundedly, even when the infinite-horizon Pareto curve is small.
By adapting existing results, we first give an algorithm that computes
the Pareto curve for determined games. Then, as the main result of
the paper, we show that for the natural class of stopping games and
when there are two reward objectives, the problem of deciding whether
a player can ensure satisfaction of the objectives with given thresholds
is decidable. The result relies on intricate and novel proof which shows
that the Pareto curves contain only finitely many points.
As a consequence, we get that the two-objective discounted-reward prob-
lem for unrestricted class of stochastic games is decidable.
1 Introduction
Formal verification is an area of computer science which deals with establishing
properties of systems by mathematical means. Many of the systems that need to
be modelled and verified contain controllable decisions, which can be influenced
by a user, and behaviour which is out of the user’s control. The latter can be
further split into events whose presence can be quantified, such as failure rate of
components, and events which are considered to be completely adversarial, such
as acts of an attacker who wants to break into the system.
Stochastic turn-based games are used as a modelling formalism for such sys-
tems [4]. Formally, a stochastic game comprises three kinds of states, owned by
one of three players: Player 1, Player 2, and the stochastic player. In each state,
one or more transitions to successor states are available. At the beginning of a
play, a token is placed on a distinguished initial state, and the player who con-
trols it picks a transition and the token is moved to the corresponding successor
state. This is repeated ad infinitum and a path, comprising an infinite sequence
of states, is obtained. Player 1 and Player 2 have a free choice of transitions, and
the recipe for picking them is called a strategy. The stochastic player is bound
to pick each transition with a fixed probability that is associated with it.
The properties of systems are commonly expressed using rewards, where
numbers corresponding to gains or losses are assigned to states of the system.
The numbers along the infinite paths are then summed, giving the total reward
of an infinite path, intuitively expressing the energy consumed or the profit
made along a system’s execution. Alternatively, the numbers can be summed
with a discounting δ < 1, giving discounted reward. It formalises the fact that
immediate gains matter more than future gains, and it is particularly important
in economics where money received early can be invested and yield interest.
Traditionally, the aim of one player is to make sure the expected (discounted)
total reward exceeds a given bound, while the other player tries to ensure the
opposite. We study the multi-objective problem in which each state is given a
tuple of numbers, for example corresponding to both the profit made on visiting
the state, and the energy spent. Subsequently, we give a bound on both profit
and energy, and Player 1 attempts to ensure that the expected total profit and
expected total energy exceed (or do not exceed) the given bound, while Player 2
tries to spoil this by making sure that at least one of the goals is not met.
The problem has been studied in [7], where it has been shown that Pareto
optimal strategies might not exist, and the game might not be determined (for
some bounds neither of the players have ε-optimal strategies). A value iteration
algorithm has been given for approximating the Pareto curve of the game, i.e. the
bounds Player 1 can ensure. The algorithm successively computes, for increasing
n, the sets of bounds Player 1 can ensure if the length of the game is restricted to
n steps. The approach has two major drawbacks. Firstly, the algorithm cannot
decide, for given bounds, if Player 1 can achieve them. Secondly, it does not scale
well since the representation of the sets can grow with increasing n, even if the
ultimate Pareto curve is small.
The above limitations show that it is necessary to design alternative solution
approaches. One of the promising directions is to characterise the shape of the
set of achievable bounds, for computing it efficiently. The value iteration of [7]
allows us to show that the sets are convex, but no further observations can be
made, in particular it is not clear whether the sets are convex polyhedra, or
if they can have infinitely many extremal points. The main result of our paper
shows that for two-objective case and stopping games, the sets are indeed convex
polyhedra, which directly leads to a decision algorithm. We believe that our
proof technique is of interest on its own. It proceeds by assuming that there is
an accumulation point on the Pareto curve, and then establishes that there must
be an accumulation point in one of the successor states such that the slope of the
Pareto curves in the accumulation points are equal. This allows us to obtain a
cycle in the graph of the game in which we can “follow” the accumulation points
and eventually revisit some of them infinitely many times. By further analysing
slopes of points on the Pareto curves that are close to the accumulation point,
we show that there are two points on the curve that are sufficiently far from
each other yet have the same slope, which contradicts the assumption that they
are near an accumulation point.
Our results also yield novel important contributions for non-stochastic games.
Although there have recently been several works on non-stochastic games with
multiple objectives, they a priori restrict to deterministic strategies, by which
the associated problems become fundamentally different. It is easy to show that
enabling randomisation of strategies extends the bounds Player 1 can achieve,
and indeed, even in other areas of game-theory randomised strategies have been
studied for decades: the fundamental theorem of game theory is that every finite
game admits a randomised Nash equilibrium [13].
Related work. In the area of stochastic games, single-objective problems are
well studied. For reachability objectives the games are determined and the prob-
lem of existence of an optimal strategy achieving a given value is in NP∩co-
NP [8]; same holds for total reward objectives. In the multi-objective setting, [7]
gives a value iteration algorithm for the multi-objective total reward problem.
Although value iteration converges to the correct result, it does so only in infinite
number of steps. It is further shown in [7] that when Player 1 is restricted to only
use deterministic strategies, the problem becomes undecidable; the proof relies
fundamentally on the strategies being deterministic and it is not clear how it
can be extended to randomised strategies. The work of [1] extends the equations
of [7] to expected energy objectives, and mainly concerns itself with a variant
of multi-objective mean-payoff reward, where the objective is a “satisfaction ob-
jective” requiring that there is a set of runs of a given probability on which all
mean payoff rewards exceed a given bound (i.e., expected values are not consid-
ered). [1] only studies existence of finite-memory strategies and the probability
bound 1; this restriction has very recently been lifted by [3], which shows that
even unrestricted satisfaction objective problem is coNP-complete.
In non-stochastic games, multi-objective optimisation has been studied for
multiple mean-payoff objectives and energy games [16]. A comprehensive analysis
of the complexity of synthesis of optimal strategies has been given [5], and it
has been shown that a variant of the problem is undecidable [15]. The work
of [2] studies the complexity of problems related to exact computation of Pareto
curves for multiple mean-payoff objectives. In [11], interval objectives are studied
for total, mean-payoff and discounted reward payoff functions. The problems for
interval objectives are a special kind of multi-objective problems that require the
payoff to be within a given interval, as opposed to the standard single-objective
setting where the goal is to exceed a given bound. As mentioned earlier, all
the above works for non-stochastic games a priori restrict the players to use
deterministic strategies, and hence the problems exhibit completely different
properties than the problem we study.
Our contribution. We give the following novel decidability results. Firstly, we
show that the problem for determined stochastic games is decidable. Then, as
the main result of the paper, we show that for non-determined games which
also satisfy the stopping assumption and for two objectives, the set of achievable
bounds forms a convex polyhedron. This immediately leads to an algorithm for
computing Pareto curves, and we obtain the following novel results as corollaries.
– Two-objective discounted-reward problem for stochastic games is decidable.
– Two-objective total-reward problem for stochastic stopping games is decid-
able.
Although we phrase our results in terms of stochastic games, to our best knowl-
edge, the above results also yield novel decidability results for multi-objective
non-stochastic games when randomisation of strategies is allowed.
Outline of the paper. In Sec. 3, we show a simple algorithm that works for de-
termined games and show how to decide whether a stopping game is determined.
In Sec. 4, we give decidability results for two-objective stopping games.
2 Preliminaries on stochastic games
We begin this section by introducing the notation used throughout the paper.
Given a vector v ∈ Rn, we use vi to refer to its i-th component, where 1 ≤ i ≤
n. The comparison operator ≤ on vectors is defined to be the componentwise
ordering: u ≤ v ⇔ ∀i ∈ [1, n]. ui ≤ vi. We write u < v when u ≤ v and
u 6= v. Given two vectors u,v ∈ Rn, the dot product of u and v is defined by
u · v =
∑n
i=1 ui · vi.
The sum of two sets of vectors U, V ⊆ Rn is defined by U + V = {u +
v |u ∈ U,v ∈ V }. Given a set V ∈ Rn, we define the downward closure of V as
dwc(V )
def
= {u | ∃v ∈ V .u ≤ v}, and we use conv(V ) for the convex closure of
V , i.e. the set of all v for which there are v1, . . .v n ∈ V and w1 . . . wn ∈ [0, 1]
such that
∑n
i=1 wi = 1 and u =
∑n
i=1 wi ·v
i. An extremal point of a set X ⊆ Rn
is a vector x ∈ X that is not a convex combination of other points in X , i.e.
x 6∈ conv(X \ {x}).
A function f : R → R is concave whenever for all x, y ∈ R and t ∈ [0, 1] we
have f(t · x+ (1− t) · y) ≥ t · f(x) + (1− t) · f(y). Given x ∈ R, the left slope of
f in x is defined by lslope(f, x)
def
= limx′→x−
f(x)−f(x′)
x−x′ . Similarly the right slope
is defined by limx′→x+
f(x)−f(x′)
x−x′ . Note that if f is concave then both limits are
well-defined, because by concavity f(x)−f(x
′)
x−x′ is monotonic in x
′; nevertheless,
the left and right slope might still not be equal.
A point p ∈ R2 is an accumulation point of f if f(p1) = p2 and for all ε > 0,
there exists x 6= p1 such that (x, f(x)) is an extremal point of f and |p1−x| < ε.
Moreover, p is a left (right) accumulation point if in the above we in addition
have x < p1 (resp. x > p1). We sometimes slightly abuse notation by saying
that x is an extremal point when (x, f(x)) is an extremal point, and similarly
for accumulation points.
A discrete probability distribution (or just distribution) over a (countable) set
S is a function µ : S → [0, 1] such that
∑
s∈S µ(s) = 1. We write D(S) for the set
of all distributions over S, and use supp(µ) = {s ∈ S | µ(s) > 0} for the support
set of µ ∈ D(S).
We now define turn-based stochastic two-player games together with the
concepts of strategies and paths of the game. We then present the objectives
that are studied in this paper and the associated decision problems.
Stochastic games.A stochastic (two-player) game is a tuple G = 〈S, (S, S♦, S©), ∆〉
where S is a finite set of states partitioned into sets S, S♦, and S©; ∆ : S×S →
[0, 1] is a probabilistic transition function such that ∆(s, t) ∈ {0, 1} if s ∈ S∪S♦
and
∑
t∈S ∆(s, t) = 1 if s ∈ S©.
S and S♦ represent the sets of states controlled by Player 1 and Player 2,
respectively, while S© is the set of stochastic states. For a state s ∈ S, the set
of successor states is denoted by ∆(s)
def
= {t ∈ S | ∆(s, t)>0}. We assume that
∆(s) 6= ∅ for all s ∈ S. A state from which no other states except for itself
are reachable is called terminal, and the set of terminal states is denoted by
Term
def
= {s ∈ S | ∆(s)={s}}.
Paths. An infinite path λ of a stochastic game G is a sequence (si)i∈N of states
such that si+1 ∈ ∆(si) for all i ≥ 0. A finite path is a prefix of such a sequence.
For a finite or infinite path λ we write len(λ) for the number of states in the
path. For i < len(λ) we write λi to refer to the i-th state si−1 of λ = s0s1 . . .
and λ≤i for the prefix of λ of length i + 1. For a finite path λ we write last(λ)
for the last state of the path. For a game G we write Ω+G for the set of all finite
paths, and ΩG for the set of all infinite paths, and ΩG,s for the set of infinite
paths starting in state s. We denote the set of paths that reach a state in T ⊆ S
by ♦T
def
= {λ ∈ ΩG | ∃i . λi ∈ T }.
Strategies. We write ΩG and Ω
♦
G for the finite paths that end with a state
of S and S♦, respectively. A strategy of Player 1 is a function π : Ω

G→D(S)
such that s ∈ supp(π(λ)) only if ∆(last(λ), s) = 1. We say that π is memoryless
if last(λ)=last(λ′) implies π(λ)=π(λ′), and deterministic if π(λ) is Dirac for all
λ ∈ Ω+G , i.e. π(λ)(s) = 1 for some s ∈ S. A strategy σ for Player 2 is defined
similarly replacing ΩG with Ω
♦
G . We denote by Π and Σ the sets of all strategies
for Player 1 and Player 2, respectively.
Probability measures. A stochastic game G, together with a strategy pair
(π, σ) ∈ Π × Σ and an initial state s, induces an infinite Markov chain on the
game (see e.g. [6]). We denote the probability measure of this Markov chain
by Pπ,σG,s . The expected value of a measurable function g : S
ω→R±∞ is defined
as Eπ,σG,s [g]
def
=
∫
ΩG,s
g dP
π,σ
G,s . We say that a game G is a stopping game if, for
every strategy pair (π, σ), a terminal state is reached with probability 1, i.e.
P
π,σ
G,s (♦Term) = 1 for all s.
Total reward. A reward function ̺ : S → Q assigns a reward to each state of
the game. We assume the rewards are 0 in all terminal states. The total reward of
a path λ is ̺(λ)
def
=
∑
j≥0 ̺(λj). Given a game G, an initial state s, a vector of n
rewards ̺ and a vector of n bounds z ∈ Rn, we say that a pair of strategies (π, σ)
yields an objective totrew(̺, z) if Eπ,σG,s [̺i] ≥ zi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. A strategy
π ∈ Π achieves totrew(̺, z) if for all σ we have that (π, σ) yields totrew(̺, z);
the vector z is then called achievable, and we use As for the set of all achievable
vectors. A strategy σ ∈ Σ spoils totrew(̺, z) if for no π ∈ Π , the tuple (π, σ)
yields totrew(̺, z). Note that lower bounds (objectives Eπ,σG,s [̺i] ≤ zi) can be
modelled by upper bounds after multiplying all rewards and bounds by −1.
A (lower) Pareto curve in s is the set of all maximal z such that for all ε > 0
there is π ∈ Π that achieves the objective totrew(̺, z − ε). We use fs for the
Pareto curve, and for the two-objective case we treat it as a function, writing
fs(x) = y when (x, y) ∈ fs. We say that a game is determined if for all states,
every bound can be spoiled or lies in the downward closure of the Pareto curve1.
Note that the downward closure of the Pareto curve equals the closure of As.
Discounted reward. Discounted games play an important role in game theory.
In these games, the rewards have a discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1) meaning that the
reward received after j steps is multiplied by δj , and so a discounted reward of a
path λ is then ̺(λ, δ) =
∑
j≥0 ̺(λj)·δ
j . We define the notions of achieving, spoil-
ing and Pareto curves for discounted reward disrew(̺, δ, z) in the same way as
for total reward. Since the problems for discounted reward can easily be encoded
using the total reward framework (by adding before each state a stochastic state
from which with probability (1− δ) we transition to a terminal state), from now
on we will concentrate on total reward, unless specified otherwise.
The problems. In this paper we study the following decision problems.
Definition 1 (Total-reward problem). Given a stochastic game G, an initial
state s0, and vectors of reward functions ̺ and thresholds z, is totrew(̺, z)
achievable from s0?
Definition 2 (Discounted-reward problem). Given a stochastic game G, an
initial state s0, vectors of reward functions ̺ and thresholds z, and a discount
factor δ ∈ (0, 1), is disrew(̺, δ, z) achievable from s0?
In the particular case when n above is 2, we speak about two-objective problems.
Simplifying assumption. In order to keep the proofs simple, we will assume
that each non-terminal state has exactly two successors and that only the states
controlled by Player 2 have weights different from 0. Note that any stochastic
game can be transformed into an equivalent game with this property in polyno-
mial time, so we do not lose generality by this assumption.
Example 3 (Floor heating problem). As an example illustrating the definitions,
as well as possible applications of our results, we consider a simplified version
of the smart-house case study presented in [12] with a difference that we model
both user comfort and energy consumption. Player 1, representing a controller,
decides which rooms are heated, while the Player 2 represents the configuration
of the house, for instance which door and windows are open, which cannot be
influenced by the controller. The temperature in another room changes based
on additional probabilistic factors. We illustrate this example in Fig. 1 and a
simple model as a stochastic game is given in Fig. 2 (left). We have to control
1 The reader might notice that in some works, games are said to be determined when
each vector can be either achieved by one player, or spoiled by the other. This is
not the case of our definition, where the notion of determinacy is weaker and only
requires ability to spoil or achieve up to arbitrarily small ε.
the floor heating of two rooms in a house, by opening at most one of the valves
V1 and V2 at a time.
The state of each room is either cold or hot, for instance in state H,C,
the first room is warm while the second one is cold, and the third room has
unknown temperature. Weights on the first dimension represent the energy con-
Fig. 1: A house with controllable
floor heating in two rooms.
sumption of the system while the second rep-
resent the comfort inside the house. Player 2
controls whether the door D between the sec-
ond room and a third one is open or not. The
temperature T in the other room of the house
is controlled by stochastic transitions. For in-
stance in the initial state (C,C), the controller
can choose either to switch on the heating in
room 1 or room 2. Then the second player
chooses whether the door is opened or not and
stochastic states determine the contribution of the other rooms: for instance from
(H,C) if the second player chooses that the door is opened then depending on
whether the temperature of the other room is low or high, room 2 can either stay
cold or get heated through the door, and the next state in that case is (H,H)
which is the terminal state. The objective is to optimise energy consumption
and comfort until both rooms are warm. The Pareto curve for a few states of
the game is depicted in Fig. 2 (right).
2.1 Equations for lower value
We recall the results of [7, 1] showing that for stopping games the sets of achiev-
able points As are the unique solution to the sets of equations defined as follows:
Xs =


dwc({(0, . . . , 0)}) if s ∈ Term
dwc(conv(
⋃
t∈∆(s)Xt)) if s ∈ S
̺(s) + dwc(
⋂
t∈∆(s)Xt) if s ∈ S♦
dwc(
∑
t∈∆(s)∆(s, t) ·Xt) if s ∈ S©
The equations can be used to design a value-iteration algorithm that itera-
tively computes sets X is for increasing i: As a base step we have X
0
s = dwc(0)
(where 0 = (0, . . . , 0)); we then substitute X is for Xs on the right-hand side of
the equations, and obtain X i+1s as Xs on the left-hand side. The sets X
i
s so
obtained converge to the least fixpoint of the equations above [7, 1]. As we will
show later, the sets X is might be getting increasingly complex even though the
actual solution Xs only comprises two extremal points.
3 Determined games
In this section we present a simple algorithm which works under the assumption
that the game is determined. For stopping games, we then give a procedure to
decide whether a game is determined.
C,C
(−1, 0)
H,C
C,H C,H
H,HH,H
H,C
(0,−1)
(0,−1)
D closed
D closed
T lo
w
T high
T low
T high
(−1, 0)
energy
comfort
−2
−1
H,H
−1
−2
H,C
H,C
H,H
C,C
Fig. 2: A stochastic two-player game modelling the floor heating problem. Vectors under
states denote a reward function when it is not (0, 0). All probabilistic transitions have
probability 1
2
. Pareto curves of a few states of the game are depicted on the right.
Theorem 3. There is an algorithm working in exponential time, which given a
determined stochastic two-player game, computes its Pareto-curve.
For the proof of the theorem we will make use of the following:
Theorem 4 ([7, Thm. 7]). Suppose Player 2 has a strategy σ such that for all
π of Player 1 there is at least one 1 ≤ i ≤ n with Eπ,σG,s (̺i) < zi. Then Player 2
has a memoryless deterministic strategy with the same properties.
From the above theorem we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 5. The following two statements are equivalent for determined games:
– A given point z lies in the downward closure of the Pareto curve for s.
– For all memoryless deterministic strategies σ of Player 2, there is a strategy
π of Player 1 such that (π, σ) yield totrew(̺, z).
Thus, to compute the Pareto curve for a determined game G, it is sufficient to
consider all memoryless deterministic strategies σ1, σ2, . . . , σm of Player 2 and
use [9] to compute the Pareto curves fσis for the games G
σi induced by G and
σi (i.e. Gσi is obtained from G by turning all s ∈ S♦ to stochastic vertices and
stipulating ∆(s, t) = σi(s) for all successors t of s; in turn, Gσi is a Markov
decision process), and obtain the Pareto curve for G as the pointwise minimum
Vs := min1≤i≤m f
σi
s .
To decide if a stopping game is determined, it is sufficient to take the down-
ward closures of solutions Vs and check if they satisfy the equations from Sec. 2.1.
Since in stopping games the solution of the equations is unique, if the sets are a
solution they are also the Pareto curves and the game is determined. If any of
the equations are not satisfied, then Vs are not the Pareto curves and the game
is not determined. Note that for non-stopping games the above approach does
not work: even if the sets do not change by applying one step of value iteration,
it is still possible that the solution is not the least fixpoint, and so we cannot
infer any conclusion.
s0
s1
s2
s3
s4
s5
1
2
9
10
1
2
1
10
(1, 0)
(0, 1)
x
fs0(x)
1
1
x
fs0(x)
1
1
Fig. 3: An example showing that value iteration might produce Pareto curves with
unboundedly many extremal points.
4 Games with two objectives
We start this section by showing that the existing value iteration algorithm
presented in Sec. 2.1 might iteratively compute sets X is with increasing number
of extremal points, although the actual resulting set Xs (and the associated
Pareto curve fs) is very simple. Consider the game from Fig. 3 (left). Applying
the value-iteration algorithm given by the equations from Sec. 2.1 for n steps
gives a Pareto curve in s0 with n − 1 extremal points. Each extremal point
corresponds to a strategy πi that in s0 chooses to go to s2 when the number
of visits of s0 is less than i, and after that chooses to go to s1. The upper
bounds of the sets Xns for n = 5 and n = 10 are drawn in Fig. 3 (centre and
right, respectively) using solid line, and their extremal points are marked with
dots. The Pareto curve fs is drawn with dashed blue line, and it consists of two
extremal points, (0, 1) and (1, 0).
We now proceed with the main result of this section, the decidability of the
two-objective strategy synthesis problem for stopping games. The result can be
obtained from the following theorem.
Theorem 6. If G is a stopping stochastic two-player game with two objectives,
and s a state of G then the Pareto curve fs has only finitely many extremal
points.
The above theorem can be used to design the following algorithm. For a
fixed number k, we create a formula ϕk over (R,+, ·,≤) which is true if and
only if for each s ∈ S there are points ps,1, . . . ,ps,k such that the sets Vs
def
=
dwc(conv({ps,1, . . .ps,k})) satisfy the equations from Sec. 2.1. Using [14] we can
then successively check validity of ϕk for increasing k, and Thm. 6 guarantees
that we will eventually get a formula which is valid, and it immediately gives us
the Pareto curve. We get the following result as a corollary.
Corollary 7. Two-objective total reward problem is decidable for stopping stochas-
tic games, and two-objective discounted-reward problem is decidable for stochastic
games.
Outline of the proof of Thm. 6. The proof of Thm. 6 proceeds by assum-
ing that there are infinitely many extremal points on the Pareto curve, and
then deriving a contradiction. Firstly, because the game is stopping, an upper
bound on the expected total reward that can be obtained with respect to a
single total reward objective is M :=
∑∞
i=0(1 − p
|S|
min) · ̺
|S|
max where pmin =
min{∆(s, s′) | ∆(s, s′) > 0} is the smallest transition probability, and ̺max =
maxi∈{1,2}maxs∈S ̺i(s) is the maximal reward assigned to a state. Thus, the
Pareto curve is contained in a compact set, and this implies that there is an
accumulation point on it. In Sec. 4.1, we show that we can follow one accumu-
lation point p from one state to one of its successors, while preserving the same
left slope. Moreover, in the neighbourhood of the accumulation point the rate at
which the right slope decreases is quite similar to the decrease in the successors,
in a way that is made precise in Lem. 9, 10, and 11. This is with the exception
of some stochastic states for which the decrease strictly slows down when going
to the successors: we will exploit this fact to get a contradiction. We construct
a transition system Ts0,p, which keeps all the paths obtained by following the
accumulation point p from s0. We show that if G is a stopping game, then we can
obtain a path in Ts0,p which visits stochastic states for which the decrease of the
right slope strictly slows down. This relies on results for inverse betting games,
which are presented in Sec. 4.2. Since this decrease can be repeated and there are
only finitely many reachable states in Ts0,p, we show in Sec. 4.3 that the decrease
of the right slope must be zero somewhere, meaning that the curve is constant
in the neighbourhood of an accumulation point, which is a contradiction.
We will rely on the properties of the equations from Sec. 2.1 and the left and
right slopes of the Pareto curve. Note that we introduced the notion of slope
only for two-dimensional sets, and so our proofs only work for two dimensions.
Generalisations of the concept of slopes exist for higher dimensions, but simple
generalisation of our lemmas would not be valid, as we will show later. Hence,
in the remainder of this section, we focus on the two-objective case. For the sim-
plicity of presentation, we will present all claims and proofs for left accumulation
points. The case of right accumulation points is analogous.
4.1 Mapping accumulation points to successor states
We start by enumerating some basic but useful properties of the Pareto curve
and its slopes. First notice that it is a continuous concave function and we can
prove the following:
Lemma 8. Let f be a continuous concave function defined on [a, b].
1. If a < x < x′ ≤ b are two reals for which lslope(f) is defined, then lslope(f, x) ≥
rslope(f, x) ≥ lslope(f, x′).
2. If (x, x′) contains an extremal point of f then lslope(fs, x) 6= lslope(fs, x′).
3. If x ∈ (a, b], then limx′→x− lslope(f, x
′) = limx′→x− rslope(f, x
′) = lslope(f, x).
To prove Thm. 6, we will use the equations from Sec. 2.1 to describe how
accumulation points on a Pareto curve for s “map” to accumulation points on
successors.
pp
r
q
p
s0
s1
s2
Fig. 4: An example of Pareto curve in a state s0 with two successors s1 and s2, for
the case of s0 ∈ S (left), s0 ∈ S♦ (centre), and s0 ∈ S© with uniform probabilities
on transitions (right). In each case, the curve in s0 has infinitely many accumulation
points.
Lemma 9. Let s0 be a Player 1 state with two successors s1 and s2, and let p
be a left accumulation point of fs0 . Then there is η(s0,p) > 0 such that for all
ε ∈ (0, η(s0,p )), there is s′ ∈ {s1, s2} such that: 1. p is a left accumulation
point in fs′ ; 2. lslope(s0,p1) = lslope(s
′,p1); 3. fs0(p1 − ε) ≥ fs′(p1 − ε) and
rslope(fs0 ,p1 − ε) ≥ rslope(fs′ ,p1 − ε).
Proof (Sketch). The point 1. follows from the fact that every extremal point in
the Pareto curve for s0 must be an extremal point in one of the successors. This is
illustrated in Fig. 4 (left): p which is an extremal point for s0 is also an extremal
point for s1. The point 2. follows because from a sequence of extremal points
(pi)i≥0 on the Pareto curve of s0 that converge to p, we can select a subsequence
that gives extremal points on s′ that converge to the left accumulation point p
on s′. Finally, to prove 3. we use the fact that the right slope of fs0 is always
between those of fs1 and of fs2 . ⊓⊔
Lemma 10. Let s0 be a Player 2 state with two successors s1 and s2, and let p
be a left accumulation point of fs0 . There is η(s0,p) > 0 such that for all ε ∈
(0, η(s0,p) ), there is s
′ ∈ {s1, s2}, such that: 1. p−̺(s0) is a left accumulation
point in fs′ ; 2. lslope(s0,p1) = lslope(s
′,p1 − ̺1(s0)); 3. fs0(p1 − ε) = fs′(p1 −
ε− ̺1(s0)) and rslope(fs0 ,p1 − ε) = rslope(fs′ ,p1 − ε− ̺1(s0)).
Proof (Sketch). A crucial observation here is that fs0(p
i
1) is either ̺2(s0) +
fs1(p
i
1−̺1(s0)) or ̺2(s0)+fs2(p
i
1−̺1(s0)). This is illustrated in Fig. 4 (center):
fs0(p1) = ̺2(s0)+fs1(p1−̺1(s0)) (there ̺(s0) = (0, 0)). Hence when we take a
sequence (pi1)i∈N, for some ℓ ∈ {1, 2} the value fs0(p
i
1) equals ̺2(s0) + fsℓ(p
i
1 −
̺1(s0)) infinitely many times. From this we get a converging sequence of points
in sℓ, and obtain that the left slopes are equal in s0 and sℓ. By further arguing
that in any left neighbourhood of pi1−̺1(s0) we can find infinitely many points
with different left slopes, we obtain that there are also infinitely many extremal
points in the neighbourhood and hence pi1−̺1(s0) is a left accumulation point.
As for the last item, the important observation here is that if at some point
p′, fs1 is strictly below fs2 then the right slope of fs0 corresponds to that of fs1 ,
and if fs1 equals fs2 then the right slope of fs0 corresponds to the minimum of
the right slopes of fs1 and fs2 (it is also interesting to note that the left slope
corresponds to the maximum of the two). ⊓⊔
Lemma 11. Let s0 be a stochastic state with two successors s1 and s2, and
p a left accumulation point of fs0 . There are points q and r on fs1 and fs2
respectively such that p = ∆(s0, s1) · q +∆(s0, s2) · r. Moreover:
1. there is (s′, t) ∈ {(s1, q), (s2, r)} such that t is a left accumulation point of
fs′ and lslope(fs0 ,p1) = lslope(fs′ , t1);
2. there is η(s0,p) > 0 such that for all ε ∈ (0, η(s0,p )):
– there are ε1 ≥ 0, ε2 ≥ 0 such that rslope(fs0 ,p1−ε) ≥ rslope(fs1 , q1−ε1),
rslope(fs0 ,p1−ε) ≥ rslope(fs2 , r1−ε2), and ε = ∆(s0, s1)·ε1+∆(s0, s2)·
ε2;
– if r is not a left accumulation point in fs2 , or lslope(fs0 ,p1) 6= lslope(fs2 , r1),
then fs0(p1 − ε) = ∆(s0, s1) · fs1
(
p1−ε−∆(s0,s2)·r1
∆(s0,s1)
)
+∆(s0, s2) · r2;
– symmetrically, if q is not a left accumulation point in fs1 , or lslope(fs0 ,p1) 6=
lslope(fs1 , q1), then fs0(p1−ε) = ∆(s0, s1)·q2+∆(s0, s2)·fs1
(
p1−ε−∆(s0,s1)·q1
∆(s0,s2)
)
.
Proof (Sketch). We use the fact that for every extremal point p′ there are unique
extremal points q′ and r′ on fs1 and fs2 , respectively, such that p
′ = ∆(s0, s1) ·
q′ +∆(s0, s2) · r′.
To prove item 1, we show that for all extremal point p′, lslope(s0,p
′) =
min(lslope(s1, q
′), lslope(s2, r
′)), which can be surprising at first glance since
one could have expected a weighted sum of the left slopes. This fact is illus-
trated in Fig. 4 (right): lslope(s0,p
′) = lslope(s1, q
′) ≤ lslope(s2, r′). The in-
equality lslope(s0,p) ≤ lslope(s1, q) (and similarly lslope(s0,p) ≤ lslope(s2, r)),
follows from concavity of fs0 : because for all ε > 0 the inequality fs0(p1 − ε) ≥
∆(s0, s1) · fs1(q1 −
ε
∆(s0,s1)
) +∆(s0, s2) · fs2(r1) holds true, from which we ob-
tain limε→0+
fs0 (p1)−fs0 (p1−ε)
ε
≤ limε→0+
fs1(q1)−fs1 (q1−ε)
ε
. Showing that the left
slope is at least the minimum of the successors’ slopes is significantly more de-
manding and technical, and we give the proof in the appendix.
Proving the second point, is based on the observation that a point on the
Pareto curve fs0 is a combination of points of fs1 and fs2 that share a common
tangent: in other words they maximize the dot product with a specific vector
on their respective curves. From this observation it is possible to link the right
slopes of these curves.
The last two points hold because with the assumption, extremal points that
converge to p from the left can be obtained as a combination from a fixed r and
points on fs2 . ⊓⊔
Now we will prove that there are no left accumulation points on the Pareto
curve. To do that, we will try to follow one in the game: if there is a left accumu-
lation point in one state then at least one of its successors also has one, as the
above lemmas show. By using the fact that the left slopes of left accumulation
points are preserved we show that the number of reachable combinations (s,p),
where s ∈ S and p is a left accumulation point, is finite. We then look at points
slightly to the left of the accumulation points, their distance to the accumula-
tion point and right slopes are also mostly preserved except in stochastic states,
where if only one successor has a left accumulation point, the decrease of the
right slope accelerate (by Lem. 11.2). By using the fact that in stopping games
we can ensure visiting such stochastic states, we will show that for some states
the right slope is constant on the left neighbourhood of the left accumulation
point, which is a contradiction.
Assume we are given a state s0 and a left accumulation point p
0 of fs0 . We
construct a transition system Ts0,p0 where the initial state is (s0,p
0), and the
successors of a given configuration (s,p) are the states (s′,p′) such that s′ is a
successor of s, and p′ is a left accumulation point of s with the same left slope
on fs′ as p on fs. Lem. 9, 10, and 11, ensure that all the reachable states have
at least one successor.
Lemma 12. For all reachable states (s,p) and (s′,p′) in the transition system
Ts0,p0 , if s = s
′, then p = p′.
Proof. Assume s = s′. By construction of Ts0,p0 , the left slope in s of p and p
′
is the same: lslope(s,p1) = lslope(s0,p
0
1) = lslope(s2,p
′
1). Assume towards a
contradiction that p < p′; the proof would work the same for p′ < p. Since p′ is
a left accumulation point, there is an extremal point in (p1,p
′
1). Lem. 8.2 tells
us that lslope(s1,p1) 6= lslope(s2,p′1) which is a contradiction. Hence p = p
′. ⊓⊔
As a corollary of this lemma, the number of states that are reachable in Ts0,p0
is finite and bounded by |S|.
4.2 Inverse betting game
To show a contradiction, we will follow a path with left accumulation points.
We want this path to visit stochastic states which have only one successor in
Ts0,p0 . For that, we will prove a property of an intermediary game that we call
an inverse betting game.
An inverse betting game is a two player game, given by 〈V∃, V∀, E, (v0, c0), w〉
where V∃ and V∀ are the set of vertices controlled by Eve and Adam, respectively,
〈V∃ ∪ V∀, E〉 is a graph whose each vertex has two successors, (v0, c0) ∈ V × R
is the initial configuration, and w : E → R is a weight function such that for all
v ∈ V :
∑
v′|(v,v′)∈E w(v, v
′) = 1.
A configuration of the game is a pair (v, c) ∈ V × R where v is a vertex
and c a credit. The game starts in configuration (v0, c0) and is played by two
players Eve and Adam. At each step, from a configuration (v, c) controlled by
Eve, Adam suggests a valuation d : E → R for the outgoing edges of v such
that
∑
v′|(v,v′)∈E w(v, v
′) · d(v, v′) = c. Eve then chooses a successor v′ such
that (v, v′) ∈ E and the game continues from configuration (v′, d(v, v′)). From
a configuration (v, c) controlled by Adam, Adam choses a successor v′ of v and
keeps the same credit, hence the game continues from (v′, c).
Intuitively, Adam has some credit, and at each step he has to distribute it by
betting over the possible successors. Then Eve choses the successor and Adam
gets a credit equal to its bet divided by the probability of this transition. The
game is inverse because Eve is trying to maximize the credit of Adam.
Theorem 13. Let 〈V∃, V∀, E, (v0, c0), w〉 be an inverse betting game. Let T ⊆
V∃ ∪ V∀ be a target set and B ∈ R a bound. If from every vertex v ∈ V , Eve
has a strategy to ensure visiting T then she has one to ensure visiting it with
a credit c ≥ 1 or to exceed the bound, that is, she can force a configuration in
(T × [c0,+∞)) ∪ (V × [B,+∞)).
Our next step is transforming the transition system Ts0,p0 into such a game.
Consider the inverse betting game B on the structure given by Ts0,p0 where
V∃ = S© are the states controlled by Eve, V∀ = S∪S♦ are controlled by Adam,
w((s,p), (s′,p′)) = ∆(s, s′) is a weight on edges and the initial configuration is
((s0,p
0), ε0). Let Us0,p0 the set of terminal states and of stochastic states that
have only one successor in Ts0,p0 . We show that in the inverse betting game
obtained from a stopping game G, Eve can ensure visiting Us0,p0 .
Lemma 14. If G is stopping, there is a strategy for Eve in B such that from
every vertex v ∈ V , all outcomes visit Us0,p0 .
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that this is not the case, then by mem-
oryless determinacy of turn-based reachability games (see e.g. [10]) there is a
vertex v and a memoryless deterministic strategy σAdam of Adam, such that no
outcomes of σAdam from v visit Us0,p0 . Let π and σ be the strategies of Player 1
and Player 2 respectively corresponding to σAdam. Formally, if h ∈ ΩG then
π(h) = σAdam(h) and if h ∈ Ω
♦
G then σ(h) = σAdam(h). We prove that all out-
comes λ in G of π, σ from v are outcomes of σAdam in B. This is by induction on
the prefixes λ≤i of the outcomes. It is clear when λ≤i ends with states that are
controlled by Player 1 and Player 2 by the way we defined π and σ, that λ≤i+1 is
also compatible with σAdam in B. For a finite path λ≤i ending with a stochastic
state s in G, two successors are possible. With the induction hypothesis that λ≤i
is compatible with σAdam, and by the assumption on σAdam, s does not belong to
Us0,p0 . Therefore, both successors of s are also in Ts0,p0 , and λ≤i+1 is compatible
with σAdam in B. This shows that outcomes in G of (π, σ) are also outcomes of
σAdam in B. Therefore, π and σ ensure that from v, we visit no state of Us0,p0
and thus no terminal state. This contradicts that the game is stopping. ⊓⊔
Putting Thm. 13 and Lem. 14 together we can conclude the following:
Corollary 15. If G is stopping then in B, for any bound B, Eve has a strategy
to ensure visiting Us0,p0 with a credit c ≥ 1 or making c exceed B.
4.3 Contradicting sequence
We define θ(s0,p
0) = min{η(s,p) | (s,p) reachable in Ts0,p0}, and consider a
sequence of points that are θ(s0,p
0) close to p0 and with a right slope that is
decreasing at least as fast as that of their predecessors.
Lemma 16. For stopping games, given s0 ∈ S, p
0 ∈ R2, and ε0 > 0, such that
ε0 < θ(s0,p
0), there is a finite sequence π(s0,p
0, ε0) = (si,p
i, εi)i≤j such that:
– (si,p
i)i≤j is a path in Ts0,p0 ;
– for all i ≤ j, rslope(fsi ,p
i
1 − εi) ≥ rslope(fsi+1 ,p
i+1
1 − εi+1).
– either εj ≥ θ(s0,p0) or sj ∈ Us0,p0 and εj ≥ ε0.
The idea of the proof is that in B, thanks to Lem. 9, 10, and 11, Adam can
always choose a successor such that rslope(fsi ,p
i
1−εi) ≥ rslope(fsi+1 ,p
i+1
1 −εi+1).
Then thanks to Cor. 15, there is a strategy for Eve to reach (Us0,p0 × [c0,+∞))∪
(V × [B,+∞)). By combining the two strategies, we obtain an outcome that
satisfies the desired properties.
We use the path obtained from this lemma to show that no matter how small
ε0 we choose, εi can grow to reach θ(s0,p
0).
Lemma 17. For all states s with a left accumulation point p and for all 0 < ε <
θ(s,p), there is some (s′,p′) reachable in Ts,p such that rslope(fs′ ,p
′
1−θ(s,p)) ≤
rslope(fs,p1 − ε).
Thanks to this lemma, we can now prove Thm. 6. Assume towards a con-
tradiction that there is a left accumulation point p in the state s. Let m =
min{lslope(fs′ ,p′1−θ(s,p)) | (s
′,p′) reachable in Ts,p} and (s′,p′) the configura-
tion of Ts,p for which this minimum is reached (it is reached because the number
of reachable configurations is finite: this is a corollary of Lem. 12). Because of
Lem. 17, rslope(fs,p1−ε) is greater than m. By Lem. 8.3, when ε goes towards 0,
rslope(fs,p1− ε) converges to lslope(fs,p1). This means that lslope(fs,p1) ≥ m.
Moreover, by construction of Ts,p, we also have that lslope(fs′ ,p
′
1) = lslope(fs,p1),
so lslope(fs′ ,p
′
1) ≥ m. Because the slopes are decreasing (Lem. 8.1), m =
rslope(fs′ ,p
′
1 − θ(s,p)) ≥ lslope(fs′ ,p
′
1) ≥ m. Hence, the left and right slopes
of fs′ are constant on [p
′
1 − θ(s,p),p
′
1], and Lem. 8.2 implies that there are no
extremal point in (p′1 − θ(s,p),p
′
1). This contradicts the fact that p
′ is a left
accumulation point: there should be an extremal point in any neighbourhood on
the left of p′. Hence, fs contains no accumulation point.
Remark 18. One might attempt to extend the proof of Thm. 6 to three or more
objectives, but this does not seem to be easily doable. Although it is possible
to use directional derivative (or pick a subgradient) instead of using left and
right slope in such setting, an analogue of Lem. 8.2 cannot be proved because
in multiple dimensions, two accumulation points can share the same directional
derivative, for a fixed direction. It is also not easily possible to avoid this problem
by following several directional derivatives instead of just one. This is because
the slope in one direction may be inherited from one successor while the slope
in another direction comes from another successor. We give more details and
example of convex sets that would contradict generalisations of Lem. 8.2 and
Lem. 10 in Appendix E.
5 Conclusions
We have studied stochastic games under multiple objectives, and have provided
decidability results for determined games and for stopping games with two ob-
jectives. Our results for non-determined games provide an important milestone
towards obtaining decidability for the general case, which is a major task which
will require further novel insights into the problem. Another research direction
concerns establishing an upper bound on the number of extremal points of a
Pareto curve; such result would allow us to give upper complexity bounds for
the problem.
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A Proofs for determined games
A.1 Proof of Lem. 5
We write ΣMD for the set of memoryless deterministic strategies of Player 2.
∀ε > 0.∃π ∈ Π. ∀σ ∈ Σ.
∧
i
Eπ,σ(̺i) ≥ zi − ε
⇔ ∀ε > 0.¬∃σ ∈ Σ. ∀π ∈ Π.
∨
i
Eπ,σ(̺i) < zi − ε (determinacy)
⇔ ∀ε > 0.¬∃σ ∈ ΣMD. ∀π ∈ Π.
∨
i
Eπ,σ(̺i) < zi − ε (Thm. 4)
⇔ ∀ε > 0.∀σ ∈ ΣMD. ∃π ∈ Π.
∧
i
Eπ,σ(̺i) ≥ zi − ε (logical equivalences)
⇔ ∀σ ∈ ΣMD. ∀ε > 0. ∃π ∈ Π.
∧
i
Eπ,σ(̺i) ≥ zi − ε (logical equivalences)
⇔ ∀σ ∈ ΣMD. ∃π ∈ Π.
∧
i
Eπ,σ(̺i) ≥ zi (property of MDPs [9])
B Proof for non-determined case
Lemma 19. Let s be a state of G.
1. The domain of definition of fs is an interval of R.
2. fs is decreasing and concave.
3. If fs is defined on (a, b) then fs is continuous on (a, b).
Proof. 1. Assume that fs is defined for some x, x
′. For all x′′ ∈ (x, x′), by
convexity (x′′, x
′′−x′
x−x′ · fs(x) +
x′′−x
x′−x · fs(x
′)) can be achieved. We define y =
sup{y | (x′′, y) achievable}, it is defined because of the previous remark, and
by the properties of stopping games (x′′, y) is achievable and we now show that
(x′′, y) ∈ fs.
Assume there is an achievable p with p1 > x
′′. Then by convexity of the
set of achievable points [7], any point in [(x, fs(x)),p ] is achievable. Because
(x, fs(x)) lies on the Pareto curve, we have fs(x) > p2 (otherwise (x, fs(x))
is not maximal point satisfying the defining properties of the Pareto curve),
therefore (x′′, x
′′−p1
x−p1
· fs(x) +
x′′−x
p1−x
· fs(p1)) is achievable which contradicts the
definition of y. Therefore, fs is defined in x
′′ and equals p2.
2. The fact that if x′ ≥ x, then fs(x) ≥ fs(x′) comes by the definition of Pareto
curves and the fact that (x, fs(x)) lies on a Pareto curve. We now prove that fs
is concave. Let x < x′ in the domain of fs and t ∈ [0, 1]. By convexity of the set
As [7], t · (x, fs(x)) + (1− t) · (x′, fs(x′)) can be ensured. Hence, there is a point
p that is strictly greater than t · (x, fs(x)) + (1− t) · (x′, fs(x′)) that belongs to
fs. Since fs is defined in t · x + (1 − t) · x′ and it is decreasing this means that
fs(t · x+ (1 − t) · x′) ≥ t · fs(x) + (1− t) · fs(x′). This shows concavity.
3. Since fs is concave, it is the negation of a convex function. A convex function
defined on an open interval is continuous on this interval. Therefore, if fs is
defined on (a, b) it continuous on (a, b). ⊓⊔
B.1 Proof of Lem. 8
We prove a bit more than what Lem. 8 gives in the main part of the paper:
Lemma 20. 1. Let f be a function (not necessarily concave) whose left slope
is well defined on the interval [a, b], then there exists x ∈ [a, b] such that
rslope(f, x) ≥ f(a)−f(b)
a−b . Similarly, there exists x
′ ∈ [a, b] such that lslope(f, x′) ≤
f(a)−f(b)
a−b .
2. If f is concave, then x 7→ lslope(f, x) is defined on the same interval as f
except the left most point.
3. If f is concave and x < x′ are two reals for which lslope(f) is defined, then
lslope(f, x) ≥ rslope(f, x) ≥ lslope(f, x′).
4. If f is concave and (x, x′) contains an extremal point of f , then lslope(f, x) 6=
lslope(f, x′).
5. If f is concave and lslope(f, x) 6= lslope(f, x′) then [x, x′] contains an ex-
tremal point.
6. If f is a concave function whose left slope is defined in x, then limx′→x− lslope(f, x
′) =
limx′→x− rslope(f, x
′) = lslope(f, x).
Proof. 1. First we show that if rslope(f, x) < d for all x ∈ [a, b] then for all
x ∈ (a, b], x < f(a) + (x − a) · d. To prove this, let c be the right-most point of
[a, b] which minimizes f(c)− f(a)− (c− a) · d. Assume towards a contradiction
that c 6= b. Since rslope(f, c) < d, there exists x ∈ (c, b) such that f(x)−f(c)
x−c < d.
Since (x− c) is positive this implies that:
f(x) < f(c) + (x − c) · d
f(x)− f(a)− (x− a) · d < f(c)− f(a)− (x− a− x+ c) · d
f(x)− f(a)− (x− a) · d < f(c)− f(a)− (c− a) · d
Which contradicts the fact that c is the right-most point of [a, b] maximizing
f(c)−f(a)−(c−a)·d. Hence, b is the only point that maximizes this quantity, and
it equals 0 in b. We therefore have that for all x ∈ [a, b), f(x) < f(a)+(x−a) ·d.
In particular, assuming towards a contradiction that for all x ∈ [a, b], rslope(f, x) <
f(a)−f(b)
a−b , we would have f(a) < f(b) + (a − b) ·
f(a)−f(b)
a−b = f(a). Hence, there
exists some x ∈ [a, b] such that rslope(f, x) ≥ f(a)−f(b)
a−b .
Consider now the function −f . As a consequence of what we just proved,
there is x ∈ [a, b] such that lslope(−f, x) ≥ rslope(−f, x) ≥ − f(a)−f(b)
a−b . Since
lslope(−f, x) = −lslope(f, x), this implies that lslope(f, x) ≤ f(a)−f(b)
a−b .
2. Assume that f is defined on [a, b] and let x ∈ (a, b]. Define the function g
by g(x′) = f(x
′)−f(x)
x′−x , it is defined for x
′ smaller than x and close enough to x.
Moreover by concavity of f , g is decreasing, therefore its left limit in x is well
defined, and equals the left slope of f in x.
3. By concavity, for x < x′ and 0 < ε < x
′−x
2 :
f(x)− f(x− ε)
ε
≥
f(x)− f(x+ ε)
ε
≥
f(x′)− f(x′ − ε)
ε
Hence, it is the same for the limit when ε moves towards 0 and lslope(f, x) ≥
lslope(f, x′).
4. Assume towards a contradiction that lslope(f, x) = lslope(f, x′), and p is an
extremal point with x < p1 < x
′. By item 3 this means the slope is constant
on [x, x′] and as a consequence of item 1, it is equal to f(x
′)−f(x)
x′−x . Since it is
an extremal point, f(p1) > f(x) + (p1 − x) ·
f(x′)−f(x)
x′−x . By item 1, there is
x′′ ∈ [x,p1] such that:
lslope(f, x′′) ≥
f(p1)− f(x)
p1 − x
>
f(x) + (p1 − x) ·
f(x′)−f(x)
x′−x − f(x)
p1 − x
>
(p1 − x) ·
f(x′)−f(x)
x′−x
p1 − x
>
f(x′)− f(x)
x′ − x
Which is in contradiction with the fact that on [x, x′] the slope is constant and
equal to f(x
′)−f(x)
x′−x .
5. Assume towards a contradiction that [x, x′] contains no extremal point, then
for all x′′ ∈ [x, x′], (x′′, f(x′′)) is a convex combination of (x, f(x)) and (x′, f(x′)).
Hence, if x′′ ∈ (x, x′], lslope(f, x′′) = f(x)−f(x
′′)
x−x′′ . This is in particular the case
for x′. Since lslope(f, x) 6= lslope(f, x′), x has a left slope different from all the
points in (x, x′]; we will prove that (x, f(x)) is an extremal point. If x is a convex
combination of two points of the curve given by f , then as all the points on its
right are below the line segment [(x, f(x)), (x′, f(x′))], one point p ∈ f with
p1 < x must be above the corresponding line. By concavity, this is also the case
for all the x′′ ∈ (p1, x). This means that
f(x′′)−f(x)
x′′−x ≤
f(x′)−f(x)
x′−x . The limit when
x′′ goes towards x is also smaller than f(x
′)−f(x)
x′−x . It cannot be greater because
by item 3 the slope decreases. This contradicts that lslope(f, x) 6= lslope(f, x′).
This contradiction proves that [x, x′] contains an extremal point.
6. The fact that limx′→x− lslope(f, x
′) ≥ limx′→x− rslope(f, x
′) ≥ lslope(f, x)
comes from the fact that the slope is decreasing (point 3). We now show lslope(f, x) ≤
limx′→x− lslope(f, x
′) which implies the result. Assume towards a contradic-
tion that limx′→x+ lslope(f, x
′) > lslope(f, x). Then there is ε > 0 such that
f(x)−f(x−ε)
ε
< limx′→x− lslope(f, x
′). By point 1, there is x′′ ∈ [x − ε, x] such
that lslope(f, x′′) ≤ f(x)−f(x−ε)
ε
< limx′→x− lslope(f, x
′). Since the slope is de-
creasing, limx′→x− lslope(f, x
′) ≥ lslope(f, x′′) which gives a contradiction. ⊓⊔
B.2 Evolution of the slope in Player 1 states (Proof of Lem. 9)
Lemma 21. Let s0 be a Player 1 state with two successors s1 and s2. For all x
where the slopes of fs1 and fs2 are defined, fs0 and its slope are defined and:
min(lslope(fs1 , x), lslope(fs2 , x)) ≤ lslope(fs0 , x) ≤ max(lslope(fs1 , x), lslope(fs2 , x))
min(rslope(fs1 , x), rslope(fs2 , x)) ≤ rslope(fs0 , x) ≤ max(rslope(fs1 , x), rslope(fs2 , x))
Proof. To lighten the notation we will write fi instead of fsi in the following.
Assume towards a contradiction that there is x where f1 and f2 are defined
and where f0 is not defined. Let y be the maximum such that p = (x, y) can be
ensured from s0. Since f0 is not defined in x, there exists (x
′, y′) ∈ As0 such that
x < x′ and y ≤ y′. By downward closure of the set of achievable points, (x, y′)
can be ensured from s0, thus by definition of y, y
′ ≤ y and therefore y = y′. Then
there is (x′, y) ∈ As0 with x
′ > x. By the characterisation of the set of values that
can be ensured, we have (x′, y) ∈ conv(As1 ∪ As2), so there are λ1, λ2 ∈ [0, 1]
and q, r ∈ As1 ∪ As2 such that λ1 + λ2 = 1 and (x
′, y) = λ1 · q + λ2 · r. If
q1 > y then there is some p
′ which can be ensured with p′1 > x and p
′
2 > y
′
which by downward closedness contradicts the fact that y is the maximum such
that (x, y) can be ensured. The case r2 > y is similar. In the remaining cases
y = q2 = r2. Assume w.l.o.g. q1 ≥ x, and therefore q ≥ (x, y). Since f1 is
defined in x, f1(x) > q2. By characterisation of the set of values that can be
ensured y ≥ f1(x) > q2 which is a contradiction.
This shows that if f1 and f2 are defined then f0 also is. Since lslope(f0, x)
is defined for all x where f0 except the left-most point, it is defined where f1
and f2 are defined except the left-most point of one of the two. In this left-most
point one of the two slopes is not defined. This shows that if both left slopes
are defined then lslope(f0, x) also is. The proof proceeds similarly for the right
slopes.
Let m = min(lslope(f1, x), lslope(f2, x)) and n = (−m, 1). Assume towards a
contradiction that lslope(f0, x) < m. Then by definition of lslope there exists x
′ <
x such that f0(x)−f0(x
′)
x−x′ < m. Since x−x
′ > 0, we have f0(x
′) > f0(x)+(x
′−x)·m.
Therefore, (x′, f0(x
′)) · n = f0(x′) − mx′ > f0(x) − mx = (x, f0(x)) · n. By
the characterization of the Pareto curve, there are q′, r′ ∈ As1 ∪ As2 , such
that (x′, f0(x
′)) is a convex combination of q′ and r′. Because their convex
combination has greater dot product with n than (x, f0(x)), it is also the case
of one of the points q′ or r′.
Without loss of generality, we assume it is q′. So we have f1(q
′
1) > f0(x) +
(q′1 − x) ·m.
– If q′1 < x, then
f0(x)−f1(q
′
1)
x−q′1
< m ≤ lslope(f1, x). By the characterization
of the Pareto curve f1(x) ≤ f0(x), therefore
f1(x)−f1(q
′
1)
x−q′1
< lslope(f1, x). By
Lem. 20.1, there is x′′ ∈ [q′1, x] such that lslope(f1, x
′′) ≤
f1(x)−f1(q
′
1)
x−q′1
<
lslope(f1, x). By Lem. 20.3, lslope(f1, x
′′) ≥ lslope(f1, x) which is a contra-
diction.
– If q′1 ≥ x, then x ∈ [x
′, q′1] and by the characterization of the Pareto curve
f0(q
′
1) ≥ f1(q
′
1), so f0(x
′
1) > f0(x)+(q
′
1−x)·m. This implies (q
′
1, f0(q
′
1))·n >
(x, f0(x)) · n. By concavity of f0:
f0(x) ≥ f0(x
′) + (x− x′) ·
f0(q
′
1)− f0(x
′)
q′1 − x
′
(x, f0(x)) · n ≥
(
1−
x− x′
q′1 − x
′
)
(x′, f0(x
′)) · n+
x− x′
q′1 − x
′
(q′1, f0(q
′
1)) · n
We obtain (x, f0(x)) · n >
(
1− x−x
′
q
′
1−x
′
)
(x, f0(x)) · n+
x−x′
q
′
1−x
′ (x, f0(x)) · n =
(x, f0(x)) · n, which is a contradiction.
We now turn to the case of max. By the characterization of the Pareto curve,
there are q, r ∈ As1 ∪ As2 such that (x, f0(x)) is a convex combination of q
and r. Let f ′, f ′′ ∈ {f1, f2}, be such that q2 ≤ f ′(q1) and r2 ≤ f ′′(r1). Let
also λ1 ∈ [0, 1] be such that (x, f0(x)) = λ1 · q + (1 − λ1) · r. We first prove
lslope(f0, x) ≤ lslope(f ′, q1) (and obtain similarly lslope(f0, x) ≤ lslope(f ′′, r1)).
By the characterisation of the Pareto curve, for all ε 6= 0, f0(x−ε) ≥ λ1 ·f
′(q1−
ε
λ1
) + (1 − λ1) · f ′′(r1). So for all ε > 0,
f0(x)−f0(x−ε)
ε
≤ λ1 ·
f ′(q1)−f
′(q1−
ε
λ1
)
ε
.
The limit when ε goes towards 0 is smaller than that of f
′(q1)−f
′(q1−ε)
ε
. Hence,
lslope(f0, x) ≤ lslope(f ′, q1).
Now, since their convex combination contains x, one of q1 and r1 is greater
than x. Assume without loss of generality that it is q1. Then q1 ≥ x and by
Lem. 3, lslope(f ′, x) ≥ lslope(f ′, q1) ≥ lslope(f0, x). This shows lslope(f0, x) ≤
max(lslope(f1, x), lslope(f2, x)).
We now turn to the case of rslope. This is in fact the same proof if we
consider the function g0 : x 7→ f0(1 − x), which is also concave and for which
lslope(g0, x) = −rslope(f0, 1 − x): at no point did we use the fact that the
slope was negative. So what we proved for f0 is also valid for g0, which means
min(rslope(fs1 , x), rslope(fs2 , x)) ≤ rslope(fs0 , x) ≤ max(rslope(fs1 , x), rslope(fs2 , x)).
⊓⊔
We are now ready to prove Lem. 9.
Lemma 9. Let s0 be a Player 1 state with two successors s1 and s2, and let p
be a left accumulation point of fs0 . Then there is η(s0,p) > 0 such that for all
ε ∈ (0, η(s0,p )), there is s
′ ∈ {s1, s2} such that: 1. p is a left accumulation
point in fs′ ; 2. lslope(s0,p1) = lslope(s
′,p1); 3. fs0(p1 − ε) ≥ fs′(p1 − ε) and
rslope(fs0 ,p1 − ε) ≥ rslope(fs′ ,p1 − ε).
Proof. By the characterisation of the Pareto curve, the extremal points of the
Pareto curve fs0 are included in the extremal points of fs1 and fs2 . Let (p
i)i∈N
be a sequence of extremal points of the Pareto curve in s0 which converges to
p. We assume that the first coordinate of the sequence is increasing (note that
we can always extract a sub-sequence which satisfies that). Each pi is either
an extremal point of s1 or of s2, therefore the Pareto curve of one of the two
contains infinitely many points pi. We first show that for any s′ for which this
holds, the first two points are true for s′. We will then show that the third point
is satisfied by one such s′.
1. Since there is a subsequence of pi which are extremal points of s′ and which
converges to p from the left, p is a left accumulation point of s′.
2. Moreover since limx′→p−1
fs0 (x
′)−fs0 (p1)
x′−p1
is well defined and (pi1)i∈N converges
to p1, we have that:
lslope(s0,p1) = lim
x′→p−1
fs0(x
′)− fs0(p1)
x′ − p1
= lim
i→∞
fs0(p
i
1)− fs0(p1)
pi1 − p1
= lim
i→∞
fs′(p
i
1)− fs′(p1)
pi1 − p1
= lslope(s′,p1)
3. Let x′ < p1. If p is not a left accumulation point for s1, let x1 = sup{x1 <
p1 | (x1, fs1(x1)) extremal in fs1} and let q be an extremal point of s0 with
q1 ∈ (x1,p1). Since extremal points of s0 are included in those of s1 and s2, the
extremal points on [q1, x] and x are the same. Since moreover (q1, f0(q1)) and
(x, f0(x)) are extremal points of both f0 and f2, the curves f0 and f2 coincide
on [q1, x]. So the property we want is satisfied by s
′ = s2 and η(s0,p) = x− q1.
Similarly, if p is not a left accumulation point for s2, then s
′ = s1 and some
η(s0,p) witnesses the property.
If p is a left accumulation point for s1 but lslope(fs1 ,p) 6= lslope(f0,p), then
by what was proven in point 2, we conclude that there is no infinite sequence
of extremal points of s1 that are also extremal points of s0 and converge to p.
There is a left neighbourhood of x where f1 is below f2 (otherwise some extremal
point would be above and also be an extremal point of f0). Hence, the curves
f0 and fs2 coincide on some neighbourhood of x. So the property we want is
satisfied by s′ = s2 and some η(s0,p).
Similarly, if lslope(fs1 ,p) 6= lslope(fs,p), then s
′ = s1 and some η(s0,p)
witnesses the property.
In the other cases, both s1 and s2 satisfy points 1 and 2. By Lem. 21, there
is s′ ∈ {s1, s2}, such that rslope(fs′ , x′) ≤ rslope(fs0 , x
′). So the property is
satisfied for any η(s0,p) such that x− η(s0,p) is still in the domain of fs0 . ⊓⊔
B.3 Evolution of the slope in Player 2 states (proof of Lem. 10)
Lemma 23. Let s0 be a Player 2 state with two successors s1 and s2. For all
x where fs1 is defined and fs2 is defined, fs0 is defined in x + ̺1(s0) and: 1. if
fs1(x) < fs2(x) then lslope(fs0 , x + ̺1(s0)) = lslope(fs1 , x) and rslope(fs0 , x +
̺1(s0)) = rslope(fs1 , x); 2. if fs1(x) = fs2(x) then lslope(fs0 , x + ̺1(s0)) =
max{lslope(fs1 , x), lslope(fs2 , x)} and rslope(fs0 , x) = min{rslope(fs1 , x), rslope(fs2 , x)}.
Proof. 1. Assume fs1(x) < fs2(x). By continuity of the curves (Lem. 19.3),
fs1(x
′) < fs2(x
′) holds for all points x′ of some neighbourhood [x − η, x + η].
By the characterization of the Pareto curve in Player 2 states (see Sec. 2.1),
we have fs0(x
′ + ̺1(s0)) = ̺2(s0) + min{fs1(x
′), fs2(x
′)}. Hence, for all x′ ∈
[x − η, x + η], fs0(x
′ + ̺1(s0)) = ̺2(s0) + fs1(x
′). So, lslope(fs0 , x + ̺1(s0)) =
limx′→x−
̺2(s0)+fs0 (x
′)−fs0(x)−̺2(s0)
x′−x = limx′→x−
fs1 (x
′)−fs1 (x)
x′−x = lslope(fs1 , x).
Similarly, rslope(fs0 , x+̺1(s0)) = limx′→x+
fs0 (x
′)−fs0 (x)
x′−x = limx′→x+
fs1 (x
′)−fs1(x)
x′−x =
rslope(fs1 , x).
2. If fs1(x) = fs2(x) and lslope(fs1 , x) = lslope(fs2 , x) then for a sequence
(xi)i∈N that converges to x from the left, limi→∞
fs0(xi+̺1(s0))−fs0(x+̺1(s0))
xi−x
=
lslope(fs0 , x + ̺1(s0)). By the characterisation of the Pareto curve, fs0(xi +
̺1(s0)) ∈ {̺2(s0) + fs1(xi),̺2(s0) + fs2(xi)}, so there are infinitely many xi in
the sequence for which ̺2(s0)+ fs1(xi) = fs0(xi+̺1(s0)) or there are infinitely
many xi in the sequence for which ̺2(s0) + fs2(xi) = fs0(xi + ̺1(s0)). Without
loss of generality we assume it is for s1. lslope(f1, x) = limi→∞
fs1 (xi)−fs1(x)
xi−x
=
limi→∞
fs0 (xi+̺1(s0))−fs0 (x+̺1(s0))
xi−x
= lslope(fs0 , x + ̺1(s0)). Hence, we proved
that lslope(fs0 , x+̺1(s0)) ∈ {̺2(s0)+ lslope(fs1 , x),̺2(s0)+ lslope(fs2 , x)}. We
could prove similarly, by considering a sequence xi that converges from the right,
that rslope(fs0 , x+ ̺1(s0)) ∈ {̺2(s0) + rslope(fs1 , x),̺2(s0) + rslope(fs2 , x)}.
We will now show that if fs1(x) = fs2(x) and lslope(fs1 , x) < lslope(fs2 , x),
then lslope(fs0 , x+ ̺1(s0)) = lslope(fs2 , x), which shows the property. Since:
lim
x′→x−
fs1(x
′)− fs1(x)
x′ − x
= lslope(fs1 , x) < lslope(fs2 , x) = lim
x′→x−
fs2(x
′)− fs2(x)
x′ − x
,
there is ε > 0, such that for all x′ ∈ [x−ε, x),
fs1 (x
′)−fs1 (x)
x′−x <
fs2 (x
′)−fs2(x)
x′−x . This
implies that fs1(x
′) > fs2(x
′), because x′−x < 0 and therefore fs0(x
′+̺1(s0)) =
̺2(s0) + fs2(x
′) (by characterization of the Pareto curve). Hence,
lslope(fs0 , x+ ̺1(s0)) = lim
x′→x−
fs0(x
′ + ̺1(s0))− fs0(x+ ̺1(s0))
x′ − x
= lim
x′→x−
fs2(x
′)− fs2(x)
x′ − x
= lslope(fs2 , x).
The proof is quite similar for the right slope. Assume rslope(fs1(x)) < rslope(fs2 , x).
Since:
lim
x′→x+
fs1(x
′)− fs1(x)
x′ − x
= rslope(fs1(x)) < rslope(fs2 , x)
= lim
x′→x+
fs2(x
′)− fs2(x)
x′ − x
,
there is ε > 0, such that for all x′ ∈ (x, x+ε),
fs1 (x
′)−fs1 (x)
x′−x <
fs2(x
′)−fs2(x)
x′−x . This
implies that fs1(x
′) < fs2(x
′), and therefore fs0(x
′ + ̺1(s0)) = ̺2(s0) + fs1(x
′)
(by characterisation of the Pareto curve). Hence,
rslope(fs0 , x+ ̺1(s0)) = lim
x′→x+
fs0(x
′ + ̺1(s0))− fs0(x+ ̺1(s0))
x′ − x
= lim
x′→x+
fs2(x
′)− fs2(x)
x′ − x
= rslope(fs2 , x).
⊓⊔
Lemma 10. Let s0 be a Player 2 state with two successors s1 and s2, and let p
be a left accumulation point of fs0 . There is η(s0,p) > 0 such that for all ε ∈
(0, η(s0,p )), there is s
′ ∈ {s1, s2}, such that: 1. p−̺(s0) is a left accumulation
point in fs′ ; 2. lslope(s0, x) = lslope(s
′,p1 − ̺1(s0)); 3. fs0(p1 − ε) = fs′(p1 −
ε− ̺1(s0)) and rslope(fs0 ,p1 − ε) = rslope(fs′ ,p1 − ε− ̺1(s0)).
Proof. We first show that for each x where fs0 is defined, there is s
′ ∈ {s1, s2}
such that lslope(s0, x) = lslope(s
′, x − ̺1(s0)). Let (xi)i∈N be a sequence con-
verging towards x. By the characterization of the Pareto curve, for each i ∈ N,
fs0(xi) ∈ {̺2(s0) + fs1(xi − ̺1(s0)),̺2(s0) + fs2(xi − ̺1(s0))}. It will be ei-
ther fs1 or fs2 infinitely often. We write s
′ for a state such that fs0(xi) =
̺2(s0) + fs′(xi − ̺1(s0)) infinitely often. We can extract a subsequence of xi
so that we can assume fs0(xi) = ̺2(s0) + fs′(xi − ̺1(s0)) for all i. Since this
sequence converges to x, by continuity of fs′ (Lem. 3) and fs0 , we have ̺2(s0)+
fs′(x − ̺1(s0)) = fs0(x). Moreover: lslope(s0, x) = limx′→x−
fs0(x
′)−fs0 (x)
x′−x =
limi→∞
fs0 (xi)−fs0(x)
xi−x
= limi→∞
fs′(xi−̺1(s0))−fs′(x−̺1(s0))
xi−x
= lslope(s′, x).
We now show we can extract (xτ(i))i∈N, an infinite subsequence of (xi)i∈N,
whose elements all have different slopes. Since p is a left accumulation point for
fs0 , for each xτ(i), there are two extremal points for fs0 in (xτ(i), x). Because of
Lem. 20.4, no more than two extremal points can have the same slope, the slope
of second extremal point p′ is strictly less than that of xτ(i). Thus, by choosing
τ(i+ 1) such that xτ(i+1) > p
′
1, we ensure that the slope of all xτ(i) is different.
This shows we can extract an infinite subsequence of (xi)i∈N whose all elements
have different slopes. To simplify notations, we will still write (xi)i∈N for this
subsequence, and assume all slopes lslope(fs0 , xi) are different.
Because we showed lslope(s0, x) ∈ {lslope(s1, x−̺1(s0)), lslope(s2, x−̺1(s0))}
for all points x where fs0 is defined, this is also the case for each xi. We can
extract an infinite subsequence of (xi)i∈N such that it always corresponds to
the same state. We can then assume that there is s′ ∈ {s1, s2}, such that for
all i ∈ N, lslope(s0, xi) = lslope(s′, xi − ̺1(s0)). Since the slopes of every xi is
different, by Lem. 20.5, this implies that there is an infinite number of extremal
points in the neighbourhood of p. This means that p is a left accumulation point
for either s1 or s2.
We now prove point 3. If p is not a left accumulation point for s1, let x1 =
sup{x1 < x | (x1, fs1(x1)) extremal in fs1}. Since fs1 and fs2 are concave their
curves can only intersect twice in [x1, x]. Since fs0 has an infinite number of
extremal points in this interval (shifted by ̺1(s0)) and fs1 has none, we can
deduce from Lem. 20.5 and Lem. 23 that fs2 is below fs1 in a neighbourhood
[q1, x] of x. Hence, for all x
′ ∈ [q1, x], fs0(x
′) = ̺2(s0)+ fs2(x
′−̺1(s0)). So the
property we want is satisfied by s′ = s2 and η(s0,p) = x− q1.
Similarly, if p is not a left accumulation point for s2, then s
′ = s1 and some
η(s0,p) witness the property.
If p is a left accumulation point for s1 but lslope(fs1 ,p1−̺1(s0)) 6= lslope(fs0 ,p1),
then we can conclude from Lem. 23 that lslope(fs1 ,p1) < lslope(fs,p1) = lslope(fs2 ,p1).
Hence, on some left neighbourhood of x, fs2 is strictly below fs1 . This means
that the curves fs0 and fs2 (shifted by ̺(s0)) coincide on some neighbourhood
of x. So the property we want is satisfied by s′ = s2 and some η(s0,p).
Similarly, if lslope(fs1 ,p1) 6= lslope(fs0 ,p1), then s
′ = s1 and some η(s0,p)
witnesses the property.
In the other cases, both s1 satisfies point (1) and (2). By Lem. 23, there is
s′ ∈ {s1, s2}, such that rslope(fs′ , x′ − ̺1(s0)) ≤ rslope(fs0 , x
′). So the property
is satisfied for s′ and any η(s0,p) such that x− η(s0,p) is still in the domain of
fs0 . ⊓⊔
C Evolution of the slope in stochastic states (proof of
Lem. 11)
Lemma 25. Let s0 be a stochastic state with two successors s1 and s2. If p
is a point of fs0 then there are q ∈ fs1 and r ∈ fs2 such that p = ∆(s0, s1) ·
q +∆(s0, s2) · r. Moreover if p′ is another point of fs0 with p1 ≤ p
′
1, then we
can chose q, q′ ∈ fs1 , r, r
′ ∈ fs2 such that p = ∆(s0, s1) · q + ∆(s0, s2) · r,
p′ = ∆(s0, s1) · q′ +∆(s0, s2) · r′, q1 ≤ q′1 and r1 ≤ r
′
1.
Proof. Because p is achievable in s0, by characterization of the Pareto curve,
there are q achievable in s1 and r achievable in s2 such that p = ∆(s0, s1) · q+
∆(s0, s2) · r. We assume towards a contradiction that q is not from fs1 (i.e. it
lies strictly below the Pareto curve); the proof works in the same way for r in s2.
Then there would be some q′ > q that is achievable in s1. By characterization
of the Pareto curve p′ = ∆(s0, s1) · q′+∆(s0, s2) · r is also achievable. However,
we have p′ > p which is a contradiction with the fact that p ∈ fs0 . This shows
the first part of the lemma.
Now for the second part of the lemma, assume that p1 ≤ p′1 and q1 > q
′
1;
the proof would work the same way if r1 > r
′
1. Then we must have r1 < r
′
1 since
∆(s0, s1) · q1 +∆(s0, s2) · r1 = p1 ≤ p′1 = ∆(s0, s1) · q
′
1 +∆(s0, s2) · r
′
1. Let us
write m(q, r) = ∆(s0, s1) ·q+∆(s0, s2) ·r to simplify notation. By monotonicity
of m, m(q1, r
′
1) > m(q
′
1, r
′
1) = p
′
1 ≥ p1 = m(q1, r1). By continuity of m, there
is x′ ∈ [r1, r′1] such that m(q1, x
′) = p′1 and similarly x ∈ [r1, r
′
1] such that
m(q′1, x) = p1.
Let us show x− r1 = r′1 − x
′.
∆(s0, s1) · q
′
1 +∆(s0, s2) · x = m(q1, x
′) = p1 = ∆(s0, s1) · q1 +∆(s0, s2) · r1
∆(s0, s2) · (x− r1) = ∆(s0, s1) · (q1 − q
′
1)
Similarly:
∆(s0, s1) · q1 +∆(s0, s2) · x
′ = p′1 = ∆(s0, s1) · q
′
1 +∆(s0, s2) · r
′
1
∆(s0, s2) · (x
′ − r′1) = ∆(s0, s1) · (q
′
1 − q1)
Let us write α = ∆(s0,s1)
∆(s0,s2)
· (q1 − q′1) = x− r1 = r
′
1 − x
′. By concavity of fs2 :
fs2(x
′) ≥ fs2(r
′
1) + (x
′ − r′1) ·
fs2(r1)− fs2(r
′
1)
r1 − r′1
fs2(x
′)− fs2(r
′
1) ≥ −α ·
fs2(r1)− fs2(r
′
1)
r1 − r′1
m (fs1(q1)− fs1(q
′
1), fs2(x
′)− fs2(r
′
1)) ≥ m
(
fs1(q1)− fs1(q
′
1),−α ·
fs2(r1)− fs2(r
′
1)
r1 − r′1
)
Similarly:
fs2(x) ≥ fs2(r1) + (x− r1) ·
fs2(r1)− fs2(r
′
1)
r1 − r′1
fs2(x) − fs2(r1) ≥ α ·
fs2(r1)− fs2(r
′
1)
r1 − r′1
m (fs1(q
′
1)− fs1(q1), fs2(x)− fs2(r1)) ≥ m
(
fs1(q
′
1)− fs1(q1), α ·
fs2(r1)− fs2(r
′
1)
r1 − r′1
)
≥ −m
(
fs1(q1)− fs1(q
′
1),−α ·
fs2(r1)− fs2(r
′
1)
r1 − r′1
)
Hence, eitherm (fs1(q1)− fs1(q
′
1), fs2(x
′)− fs2(r
′
1)) ≥ 0 orm(fs1(q
′
1)−fs1(q1),
fs2(x)−fs2(r1)) ≥ 0. In the first casem (fs1(q1), fs2(x
′)) ≥ m (fs1(q
′
1), fs2(r
′
1)) =
p′2. So we could have chosen q and r
′′ = (x′, fs2(x
′)) instead of q′ and r′ respec-
tively, and all the properties required in the lemma are satisfied: p = m(q, r),
p′ = m(q, r′′), q1 ≤ q1 and r1 ≤ r′′1 .
In the second case m (fs1(q
′
1), fs2(x)) ≥ m (fs1(q1), fs2(r1)) = p2. So we
could have chosen q′ and r′′ = (x, fs2(x)) instead of q and r respectively, and all
the properties required in the lemma are satisfied: p = m(q′, r′′), p′ = m(q′, r′),
q′1 ≤ q
′
1 and r
′′
1 ≤ r
′
1. ⊓⊔
Lemma 26. Let s0 be a stochastic state with two successors s1 and s2. If p
is a point of fs0 and fs1 has a point q and fs2 a point r such that p =
∆(s0, s1) · q + ∆(s0, s2) · r, then if lslope(s1, q1) and lslope(s2, r1) are defined
then lslope(s0,p1) = min(lslope(s1, q1), lslope(s2, r1)).
Proof. We first show that lslope(s0,p1) ≤ lslope(s1, q1). We have that for all ε:
fs0(p1 − ε) ≥ ∆(s0, s1) · fs1(q1 −
ε
∆(s0,s1)
) + ∆(s0, s2) · fs2(r1) because of the
characterisation of the Pareto curve and the fact that p1 − ε = ∆(s0, s1) · (q1 −
ε
∆(s0,s1)
) +∆(s0, s2) · r1. Therefore:
lim
ε→0+
fs0(p1)− fs0(p1 − ε)
ε
= lim
ε→0+
∆(s0, s1) · fs1(q1) +∆(s0, s2) · fs2(r1)− fs0(p1 − ε)
ε
≤ lim
ε→0+
∆(s0, s1) · (fs1(q1)− fs1(q1 −
ε
∆(s0,s1)
))
ε
≤ lim
ε→0+
(fs1(q1)− fs1(q1 −
ε
∆(s0,s1)
))
ε
∆(s0,s1)
≤ lim
ε→0+
fs1(q1)− fs1(q1 − ε)
ε
Therefore, lslope(s0,p1) ≤ lslope(s1, q1). The proof also works for r and therefore
lslope(s0,p1) ≤ min(lslope(s1, q1), lslope(s2, r1)).
We now show that lslope(s0,p1) ≥ min(lslope(s1, q1), lslope(s2, r1)). Assume
towards a contradiction that lslope(s0,p1) < min(lslope(s1, q1), lslope(s2, r1)).
By definition of lslope there exists x′ < p1 such that:
fs0(x
′)− fs0(p1)
x′ − p1
< min(lslope(s1, q1), lslope(s2, r1))
By Lem. 25, there are q′ ∈ fs1 and r
′ ∈ fs2 such that (x
′, fs0(x
′)) = ∆(s0, s1) ·
q′ +∆(s0, s2) · r′ and q′1 < q1, r
′
1 < r1. This gives:
min(lslope(s1, q1), lslope(s2, r1)) >
fs0(x
′)− fs0(p1)
x′ − p1
>
∆(s0, s1) · q′2 +∆(s0, s2) · r
′
2 −∆(s0, s1) · q2 −∆(s0, s2) · r2
∆(s0, s1) · q′1 +∆(s0, s2) · r
′
1 −∆(s0, s1) · q1 −∆(s0, s2) · r1
>
∆(s0, s1) · (q′2 − q2) +∆(s0, s2) · (r
′
2 − r2)
∆(s0, s1) · (q′1 − q1) +∆(s0, s2) · (r
′
1 − r1)
By concavity of the Pareto curves:
q′2 − q2
q′1 − q1
≥ lslope(s1, q1)
q′2 − q2 ≤ lslope(s1, q1) · (q
′
1 − q1) because q
′
1 − q1 is negative
r′2 − r2
r′1 − r1
≥ lslope(s2, r1)
r′2 − r2 ≤ lslope(s2, r1) · (r
′
1 − r1)
And since ∆(s0, s1) · (q
′
1 − q1) +∆(s0, s2) · (r
′
1 − r1) is negative:
∆(s0, s1) · (q′2 − q2) +∆(s0, s2) · (r
′
2 − r2)
∆(s0, s1) · (q′1 − q1) +∆(s0, s2) · (r
′
1 − r1)
≥
∆(s0, s1) · lslope(s1, q1) · (q
′
1 − q1) +∆(s0, s2) · lslope(s2, r1) · (r
′
2 − r2)
∆(s0, s1) · (q′1 − q1) +∆(s0, s2) · (r
′
1 − r1)
≥
∆(s0, s1) ·min(lslope(s1, q1), lslope(s2, r1)) · (q′1 − q1)
∆(s0, s1) · (q′1 − q1) +∆(s0, s2) · (r
′
1 − r1)
+
∆(s0, s2) ·min(lslope(s1, q1), lslope(s2, r1)) · (r′2 − r2)
∆(s0, s1) · (q′1 − q1) +∆(s0, s2) · (r
′
1 − r1)
≥ min(lslope(s1, q1), lslope(s2, r1))
This would imply min(lslope(s1, q1), lslope(s2, r1)) > min(lslope(s1, q1), lslope(s2, r1)),
hence a contradiction. Therefore, lslope(s0,p1) ≥ min(lslope(s1, q1), lslope(s2, r1)),
which concludes the proof. ⊓⊔
Lemma 27. Let s0 be a stochastic state with two successors s1 and s2. If p
is an extremal point in s0 then s1 has an extremal point q and s2 has an
extremal point r such that p = ∆(s0, s1) · q + ∆(s0, s2) · r. Moreover q and
r are uniquely defined and if lslope(s1, q1) and lslope(s2, r1) are defined then
lslope(s0,p1) = min(lslope(s1, q1), lslope(s2, r1)). If only one of the two slopes is
defined then lslope(s0,p1) is equal to that slope, and if none of the two is defined
then lslope(s0,p1) is undefined.
Proof. By the fixpoint characterisation of the achievable points, p = ∆(s0, s1) ·
q +∆(s0, s2) · r for some r achievable in s2 and q achievable in s1.
We first show that q is extremal in s1 and r is extremal in s2. Assume
towards a contradiction that there are q1, q2 achievable from s1 such that q ∈
conv(q1, q2), then p ∈ conv(∆(s0, s1)·q1+∆(s0, s2)·r, ∆(s0, s1)·q2+∆(s0, s2)·r)
and both these points are achievable from s0 because of the characterization of
the Pareto curve. This contradicts that p is an extremal point. The proof works
similarly for r, and therefore q and r are extremal in fs1 and fs2 respectively.
We now prove that q and r are uniquely defined. Assume towards a con-
tradiction that there are (q1, r1) 6= (q2, r2) with q1 and q2 extremal in s1
and r1 and r2 extremal in s2 such that p = ∆(s0, s1) · q1 + ∆(s0, s2) · r1 and
p = ∆(s0, s1) ·q2+∆(s0, s2) ·r2. Note that q1 6= q2 and r1 6= r2. Then we would
have p = 12 ·(∆(s0, s1)·q
1+∆(s0, s2)·r2)+
1
2 ·(∆(s0, s1)·q
2+∆(s0, s2)·r1). This
means that p ∈ conv(∆(s0, s1)·q1+∆(s0, s2)·r2, ∆(s0, s1)·q2+∆(s0, s2)·r1), and
both these points are achievable, which contradicts the fact that p is extremal.
Therefore, q and r are uniquely defined.
If both the slopes of f1 and f2 are defined then Lem. 26 implies the de-
sired property of the slope. Assume now that exactly one of them is not de-
fined; without loss of generality we assume lslope(f1) is defined and lslope(f2)
is not. Then this means that f2 is not defined at the left of r1. Let x
′ < p1
such that f0(x
′) is defined. By Lem. 26, there are q′, r′ such that (x′, f0(x
′)) =
∆(s0, s1) · q′ +∆(s0, s2) · r′ and r′1 ≤ r1. Since f2 is not defined at the left of
r1, we have that r1 = r
′
1 and so r
′ = r. Therefore, at the left of x, f0(x
′) =
∆(s0, s1) · f1
(
q1 +
x′−x
∆(s0,s1)
)
+ ∆(s0, s2) · r. Thus, lslope(f0, x) = ∆(s0, s1) ·
1
∆(s0,s1)
· lslope(f1, q1) = lslope(f1, q1).
Now in the case where none of the two slopes are defined, this means that f1
and f2 are not defined at the left of q1 and r1 respectively. By Lem. 26, we can
deduce that there is no point of f0 at the left of p, hence lslope(f0,p1) is also
not defined. ⊓⊔
For the proof of Lem. 32 below we will need several properties of the dot
product. These are formalised in the lemmas below.
Lemma 28. Let n ∈ R2 be a vector with n1 > 0 and n2 > 0. If p maximises
the dot product n · p among the achievable vectors As, then p ∈ fs (i.e. p is a
maximal point in As).
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that there is p′ ≥ p which is achievable.
Either p′1 > p1 and p
′
2 ≥ p2, or p
′
1 ≥ p1 and p
′
2 > p2. Then as n1 > 0 and
n2 > 0, n · p
′ > n · p. This contradicts that p maximises the dot product. ⊓⊔
Lemma 29. Let n ∈ R2 be a vector with n1 > 0 and n2 > 0. If p maximises
the dot product n · p among achievable vectors, then lslope(fs,p1) ≥
−n1
n2
≥
rslope(fs,p1).
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that lslope(fs,p1) <
−n1
n2
. Then there is
x′ < p1 such that:
fs(x
′)− fs(p1)
x′ − p1
<
−n1
n2
n2 · (fs(x
′)− fs(p1)) > −n1 · (x
′ − p1) because x
′ − p1 < 0
n1 · x
′ + n2 · fs(x
′) > n1 · p1 + n2 · fs(p1)
This contradicts that p maximises the dot product. ⊓⊔
Lemma 30. If p ∈ fs then it maximises the dot product with (−lslope(fs,p1), 1)
and with (−rslope(fs,p1), 1) among achievable vectors As.
Proof. Let p′ be a point of fs. Since fs is concave, p
′ is below the line {(p1, fs(p1))+
t · (1, lslope(fs,p1)) | t ∈ R}. So p′2 ≤ fs(p1) + (p
′
1 − p1) · lslope(fs,p1). Then,
looking at the dot product:
(−lslope(fs,p1), 1) · p
′ = p′2 − p
′
1 · lslope(fs,p1)
≤ fs(p1) + (p
′
1 − p1) · lslope(fs,p1)− p
′
1 · lslope(fs,p1)
≤ fs(p1)− p1 · lslope(fs,p1)
≤ fs(p1)− p1 · lslope(fs,p1)
≤ (−lslope(fs,p1), 1) · (p1, fs(p1))
≤ (−lslope(fs,p1), 1) · p
The proof works similarly for (−rslope(fs,p1), 1). ⊓⊔
Lemma 31. Let n be a vector in R2, Y, Z ⊆ R2, λ1, λ1 ∈ R>0, and X =
λ1Y + λ2Z. Let (y, z) ∈ Y × Z and x = λ1y + λ2z. Then y and z maximize
the dot product with n among vectors of Y and Z respectively, if and only if, x
maximizes the dot product with n among vectors of X.
Proof. Assume that y and z maximise the dot product with n and let a ∈
λ1Y +λ2Z. We have that a ·n = λ1b ·n+λ2c ·n for some (b, c) ∈ Y ×Z. This
is smaller than λ1y · n + λ2z · n, since they maximize the dot product with n
within their respective sets. It is therefore smaller than x · n.
Reciprocally, assume that x maximises the dot product with n. If there is
u ∈ Y such that u ·n > y ·n then λ1u+ λ2z has a greater dot product with n
than x, which is a contradiction. ⊓⊔
Lemma 32. Let s0 be a stochastic state with two successors s1 and s2. Let
p ∈ fs0 , q ∈ fs1 , and r ∈ fs2 such that p = ∆(s0, s1) · q + ∆(s0, s2) · r. For
all ε > 0, there are ε1, ε2 such that rslope(fs0 ,p1 − ε) ≥ rslope(fs1 , q1 − ε1),
rslope(fs0 ,p1 − ε) ≥ rslope(fs2 , r1 − ε2), and ε = ∆(s0, s1) · ε1 +∆(s0, s2) · ε2.
Proof. By Lem. 25, there are q′ and r′ such that (p1−ε, fs0(p1−ε)) = ∆(s0, s1)·
q′ + ∆(s0, s2) · r′ and lslope(fs0 ,p1 − ε) = min{lslope(fs1 , q
′
1), lslope(fs2 , r
′
1)}.
We let ε1 = r1 − r′1 and ε2 = q1 − q
′
1.
Let n = (−rslope(fs0 ,p1 − ε), 1) be a vector that follows the normal to the
slope in p1−ε. By Lem. 30, p′ = (p1−ε, fs0(p1−ε)) maximises the dot product
with n on the curve of fs0 . By Lem. 31, it is also the case of q
′ and r′ on
the curve of fs1 and fs2 respectively. Therefore, by Lem. 29, lslope(fs1 , q1 −
ε1) ≥ rslope(fs0 ,p1 − ε) ≥ rslope(fs1 , q1 − ε1) and similarly rslope(fs0 ,p1− ε) ≥
rslope(fs2 , r1 − ε2). ⊓⊔
Intuitively the next lemma says that for a stochastic state s0 with successors
s1 and s2, if s1 has no left accumulation point, then the slopes decrease faster
in s2 than in s0.
Lemma 11. Let s0 be a stochastic state with two successors s1 and s2, and
p a left accumulation point of fs0 . There are points q and r on fs1 and fs2
respectively such that p = ∆(s0, s1) · q +∆(s0, s2) · r. Moreover:
1. there is (s′,p′) ∈ {(s1, q), (s2, r)} such that p′ is a left accumulation point
of fs′ and lslope(fs0 ,p1) = lslope(fs′ ,p
′
1);
2. there is η(s0,p) > 0 such that for all ε ∈ [0, η(s0,p )):
– there are ε1, ε2 such that rslope(fs0 ,p1−ε) ≥ rslope(fs1 , q1−ε1), rslope(fs0 ,p1−
ε) ≥ rslope(fs2 , r1 − ε2), and ε = ∆(s0, s1) · ε1 +∆(s0, s2) · ε2.
– if r is not a left accumulation point in fs2 , or lslope(fs0 ,p1) 6= lslope(fs2 , r1),
then fs0(p1 − ε) = ∆(s0, s1) · fs1
(
p1−ε−∆(s0,s2)·r1
∆(s0,s1)
)
+∆(s0, s2) · r2.
– symmetrically, if q is not a left accumulation point in fs1 , or lslope(fs0 ,p1) 6=
lslope(fs1 , q1), then fs0(p1−ε) = ∆(s0, s1)·q2+∆(s0, s2)·fs1
(
p1−ε−∆(s0,s1)·q1
∆(s0,s2)
)
.
Proof. Let (pi)i∈N be a sequence of extremal points in s0 with increasing first
coordinate which converges towards p. By Lem. 27, there are qi and ri extremal
in fs1 and fs2 respectively, such that p
i = ∆(s0, s1) · qi +∆(s0, s2) · ri. Lem. 25
tells use that for a particular index i, we could choose qi, ri, qi+1 and ri+1 such
that qi1 ≤ q
i+1
1 and r
i
1 ≤ r
i+1
1 . But since Lem. 27 shows that q
i and ri are
uniquely defined, the sequence indeed satisfies the fact that x-coordinates are
increasing. The sequences qi and ri converge because their first coordinate are
increasing and bounded. The limits q and r are such that p = ∆(s0, s1) · q +
∆(s0, s2) · r.
1. Since pi contains an infinite number of different points, by Lem. 20.4, there
should also be an infinite number of different slopes (no more than two ex-
tremal points can have the same slope). By Lem. 27, we have that for all in-
dex i, lslope(s0,p
i) = min(lslope(s1, q
i), lslope(s2, r
i)). This means one of qi and
ri gives an infinite number of slopes, and therefore also an infinite number of
points. Let say that it is qi. Since the points of the sequence lie on the Pareto
curve and converge to q, q is a left accumulation point. Moreover by Lem. 20.6,
lslope(fs0 ,p) = lslope(fs1 , q). Similarly, if the r
i contains infinitely many differ-
ent points, then r is a left accumulation point and lslope(fs0 ,p) = lslope(fs2 , r).
2. Note that lslope(fs0 , ·) is defined at a neighbourhood on the left of p1 because
it is a left accumulation point. We let η(s0,p) be such that p1 − η(s0,p) is
included in that neighbourhood. By Lem. 32, we have that for all ε ∈ [0, η(s0,p)),
there are ε1, ε2 such that rslope(fs0 ,p1−ε) ≥ rslope(fs1 , q1−ε1), rslope(fs0 ,p1−
ε) ≥ rslope(fs2 , r1 − ε2), and ε = ∆(s0, s1) · ε1 +∆(s0, s2) · ε2.
We now look at the cases where r is not a left accumulation point of s2
or lslope(fs0 ,p1) 6= lslope(fs2 , r1). In the first case, it is clear that the se-
quence of ri does not contain infinitely many different points. In the second
case, by Lem. 27, lslope(fs0 ,p1) < lslope(fs2 , r1). By Lem. 20.6, the slope in p
is the limit of the slopes in the points pi, So there is an index j after which
lslope(fs0 ,p
i
1) < lslope(fs2 , r1) for i ≥ j. By Lem. 30, r maximises the dot prod-
uct with (−lslope(fs2 , r1), 1) on the curve of fs2 . By the same lemma, p max-
imises the dot product with (−lslope(fs0 ,p1), 1) on the curve of fs0 . Since p =
∆(s0, s1)·q+∆(s0, s2)·r, Lem. 31 implies that r also maximises the dot product
with (−lslope(fs0 ,p1), 1) on the curve of fs2 . The point r therefore maximises the
dot product with all vectors (α, 1) with α ∈ [−lslope(fs0 ,p1),−lslope(fs0 ,p1)].
This is in particular the case for (−lslope(fs0 ,p
i
1), 1) where i ≥ j. By Lem. 31,
this implies that ri = r. Hence, in both cases, we can extract a subsequence of
pi where ri is a constant r0. Since the sequence ri converges to r, we get r0 = r.
We have that qi = p
i+∆(s0,s2)·r
∆(s0,s1)
.
Let us show that for p′ on the Pareto curve of s0 close enough at the left to p
there is q′ on the Pareto curve in s1 such that p
′ = ∆(s0, s1)·q
′+∆(s0, s2)·r. Let
p′ such that p′1 > p
0
1, we will show that such a q
′ exists. By Lem. 25 there are q1
and r1 such that p′ = ∆(s0, s1)·q1+∆(s0, s2)r1 and because p0 = ∆(s0, s1)·q0+
∆(s0, s2) · r, we can choose r′1 ≥ r
0
1 = r1 Since p = ∆(s0, s1) · q
0 +∆(s0, s2) · r,
we can also choose q2 and r2 such that p′ = ∆(s0, s1) · q2 + ∆(s0, s2) · r2
and r21 ≤ r
0
1 = r. There exists λ1, λ2 ∈ [0, 1] whose sum is 1 and such that
λ1 · r
1 + λ2 · r
2 = r. Moreover letting q′ = λ1 · q
1 + λ2 · q
2, we obtain that
p′ = ∆(s0, s1) · q′ +∆(s0, s2) · r.
Therefore, for x′ ∈ [p01,p1), f0(x
′) = ∆(s0, s1) · f1(q′1) + ∆(s0, s2) · f2(r1)
where q′1 is such that x
′ = ∆(s0, s1) · q
′
1 +∆(s0, s2) · r1. That means f0(x
′) =
∆(s0, s1) · f1
(
x′+∆(s0,s2)
∆(s0,s1)
)
+∆(s0, s2) · f2(r1). ⊓⊔
D Inverse betting game
D.1 Proof of Thm. 13
Theorem 13. Let 〈V,E, (v0, c0), w〉 be a inverse betting game. Let T ⊆ V be a
target set and B ∈ R a bound. If from every vertex v ∈ V , Eve has a strategy to
ensure visiting T then she has one to ensure visiting it with a valuation of the
counter c ≥ 1 or to exceed the bound, that is she can force a configuration in
(T × [c0,+∞)) ∪ (V × [B,+∞)).
Proof. Assuming Eve has a strategy to ensure visiting T , then she has a mem-
oryless strategy to do so (see for example [10]). We write σ : V → V for the
function on states associated to this memoryless strategy that ensures visiting
T from v (it is easy to recover the full strategy from there: h 7→ σ(last(h))). We
also write a(v) for the length of the longest path from v compatible with σ that
does not reach T . Note that a(v) is bounded by |V | and decrease with each step
compatible with σ.
We define a potential function over configurations: p(v, c) = c+W a(v)−W |V |.
Note that because a is bounded, when p goes to infinity, c also goes to infinity.
The idea for our strategy is to never make this potential decrease. We show
that it is possible to do so in each configuration that is not a target. Given a
configuration (v, c), let us write v1 and v2 the successors of v and c1 and c2 the
respective valuations of these successors chosen by Adam. One of the successors
is closer to T with respect to σ, so without loss of generality we assume that
a(v1) ≤ a(v)− 1. We have that c = w(v, v1) · c1 + w(v, v2) · c2.
p(v1, c1) = c1 +W
a(v1) −W |V |
≥ c1 +W
a(v)−1 −W |V | (as a(v1) ≤ a(v)− 1 and W ≤ 1)
p(v2, c2) = c2 +W
a(v2) −W |V |
≥ c2 (as a(v2) ≤ |V | and W ≤ 1)
w(v, v1) · p(v1, c1) + w(v, v2) · p(v2, c2)
≥ w(v, v1) · c1 + w(v, v1) · (W
a(v)−1 −W |V |) + w(v, v2) · c2
≥ c+ w(v, v1) · (W
a(v)−1 −W |V |)
≥ c+W · (W a(v)−1 −W |V |) (as w(v, v1) ≥W )
≥ c+W a(v) −W |V |+1
≥ p(v, c) +W |V | −W |V |+1
Since w(v, v1) + w(v, v2) = 1, either p(v1, c1) ≥ p(v, c) +W
|V | −W |V |+1 or
p(v2, c2) > p(v, c) +W
|V | −W |V |+1. We define σ′, to choose (v1, c1) in the first
case and (v2, c2) in the second one. Along any path compatible with this strategy
the potential at each step increases by at least W |V |−W |V |+1, which is strictly
positive. This means that either it will reach a target (then a(v) can no longer
decrease) or it goes to infinity, and so does c.
D.2 Following a point close to the left accumulation point (proof of
Lem. 16
We consider a sequence of points that are θ(s0,p0) close to p0 and with a slope
that is decreasing at least as fast as that of their predecessors.
Lemma 16. For stopping games, given s0,p
0, ε0, such that ε0 < θ(s0,p
0), there
exists a finite sequence π(s0,p
0, ε0) = (si,p
i, εi)i≤j such that:
– (si,p
i)i≤j is a path in Ts0,p0 ;
– for all i ≤ j, rslope(fsi , p
i
1 − εi) ≥ rslope(fsi+1 , p
i+1
1 − εi+1).
– either sj ∈ Us0,p0 and εj ≥ ε0 or εj ≥ θ(s0,p
0).
Proof. To construct this path, we will invoke results on inverse betting games
presented in Sec. 4.2. Consider the inverse betting game given by Ts0,p0 in
Sec. 4.2.
We show in every configuration ((si,p
i), ci) with ci ≤ θ(s0,p0), Adam has a
choice in its action such that the successor ((si+1,p
i+1), ci+1) will be such that
lslope(fsi , p
i
1 − ci) ≥ lslope(fsi+1 , p
i+1
1 − ci+1).
– For Player 1 states, this is thanks to Lem. 9: since εi ≤ θ(s0,p0) ≤ η(si,pi),
we have that there is s′ in ∆(si) that is a successor of si in Ts0,p0 (because
it has a left accumulation point pi and lslope(si, p
i
1) = lslope(s
′, pi1)) and
such that rslope(fsi , p
i
1 − εi) ≥ rslope(fs′ , p
i
1 − εi). Since Adam controls the
configurations corresponding to Player 1 states, he can chose the appropriate
successor.
– For Player 2 states, thanks to Lem. 10: since εi ≤ θ(s0,p0) ≤ η(si,pi), we
have that there is s′ in ∆(si) that is a successor of si in Ts0,p0 (because it
has a left accumulation point pi and lslope(si, p
i
1 + ̺1(si)) = lslope(s
′, pi1))
and such that rslope(fsi , p
i
1 + ̺1(si)− εi) = rslope(fs′ , p
i
1 − εi). Since Adam
controls the configurations corresponding to Player 2 states, he can chose the
appropriate successor.
– If si is a stochastic state, then by Lem. 32 there are c1, c2 ∈ R such that
the successors (s1, q) and (s2, r) of (si,p
i) in Ts0,p0 , are such that ci =
∆(s0, si) · c1 + ∆(si, s2) · c2 and rslope(fsi , p
i
1 − ci) ≥ rslope(fs1 , q1 − c1)
and rslope(fsi , p
i
1 − ci) ≥ rslope(fs2 , r1 − c2). So by choosing c1 for s1 and
c2 for s2, Adam ensures that for all choices of Eve, rslope(fsi , p
i
1 − εi) ≥
rslope(fsi+1 , p
i+1
1 − εi+1).
With such choices for Adam, there is a strategy σ∀ that ensures that rslope(fsi , p
i
1−
ci) is decreasing along the outcome of the game.
By Cor. 15, for any bound B there is a strategy for Eve to ensure we reach
a configuration in (Us0,p0 × [c0,+∞))∪ (V × [B,+∞)). This is in particular the
case for B = θ(s0,p
0), and we write σ∃ the corresponding strategy.
The outcome ρ of (σ∃, σ∀) has both properties. We now distinguish two types
of paths:
– If ρ reaches a configuration with credit greater than θ(s0,p
0), then let j be
the first index where this happen. We have that for all i < j, rslope(fsi , p
i
1−
εi) ≥ rslope(fsi+1 , p
i+1
1 − εi+1), thanks to the construction of strategy σ∀.
– Otherwise, we have for all i that rslope(fsi , p
i
1 − εi) ≥ rslope(fsi+1 , p
i+1
1 −
εi+1), thanks to the construction of strategy σ∀. Moreover since σ∃ is winning
and we do not get to a configuration in V × [θ(s0,p0),+∞), ρ reaches Us0,p0
with a credit greater than the initial credit that was ε0. Let j be the first
index where this happens.
In both case we have that ρ≤j is a witness of the property. ⊓⊔
D.3 Proof of Lem. 17
Lemma 17. For all states s with a left accumulation point p and for all ε <
θ(s,p), there is some (s′,p′) reachable in Ts,p such that rslope(fs′ ,p
′
1−θ(s0,p
0)) ≤
rslope(fs,p1 − ε).
Proof. Consider the sequence π(s,p, ε) as defined in Lem. 16. Either for the last
configuration, εj is greater than θ(s,p) in which case we directly get the property
for (s′,p′) = (sj ,p
j); or we reach Us0,p0 . In this case, we have that εj ≥ ε, and by
Lem. 11.2, there is a successor (sj+1,p
j+1) in Ts,p such that for all ε ≤ θ(s0,p0),
fsj (p
j
1 − ε) = ∆(sj , sj+1) · fsj+1
(
p
j
1−ε−∆(sj ,s
′)·r1
∆(sj ,sj+1)
)
+∆(sj , s
′) · fs′(r1) for some
state s′ and real r1. This gives that rslope(fsj , p
j
1 − εj) = rslope(fsj+1 , p
j+1
1 −
εj
∆(sj ,sj+1)
). We write δ = max({∆(s, s′) | s, s′ ∈ S} \ {1}). Since ∆(sj , sj+1) ≤ δ
and the slope is decreasing: rslope(fsj , p
j
1 − εj) ≥ rslope(fsj+1 , p
j+1
1 −
εj
δ
).
Note that each time we repeat this, εj is multiplied by at least
1
δ
. Hence,
after finitely many steps we will reach a value greater than θ(s,p), which shows
the property. ⊓⊔
E Challenges for generalisation of our results
This section enumerates the reasons why we were unable to generalize results to
multiple dimensions.
The notions of left-slope and right-slope still makes sense in three dimensions
(and we could think of generalising them: front slope, back slope and other
directions). However, the properties that we used in the two-dimensional case
are now longer true, as we illustrate in the following lemmas. We write lslopei
for the slope in the direction of decreasing i-th dimension.
Lemma 37. There is a bounded convex set X ⊂ R3, for which there exists two
extremal points (x, y, z) and (x′, y′, z′) such that lslope1(f, (x, y)) = lslope1(f, (x
′, y′))
where fX is the function defined by f(x, y) = sup{z | (x, y, z) ∈ X}.
Proof. Let X = {(x, y, z) | x+y+z ≤ 1∧x ≤ 1∧y ≤ 1}. The points a = (1, 0, 0)
and b = (0, 1, 0) are extremal. fX(1 − ε, 0) = ε and fX(0 − ε, 1) = ε therefore
lslope1(fX , a) = −1 = lslope1(fX , b).
Thus to generalise Lem. 8.2 to dimension n, we would need to consider more
than n directions. We could for instance consider a property of this kind:
Conjecture: If X ⊂ Rn is a bounded convex set and p 6= p′ are extremal
points of X , then ∃i. lslopei(fX , p) 6= lslopei(fX , p).
Assuming this conjecture was true, there would still be the problem of how
to follow an accumulation point. In the two-dimensional case, we chose at each
step an accumulation point with the same slope. Now in higher dimension, we
may not be able to follow a accumulation point that has the same slope in
all directions (and if the slope is not preserved in all directions, our conjecture
cannot be used). We illustrate this problem, with the following lemma that shows
that we could not extend the techniques used in Lem. 10.
Lemma 38. There are bounded convex sets X,Y, Z such that X = Y ∩ Z,
lslope1(fX , p) 6= lslope1(fY , p) and lslope2(fX , p) 6= lslope2(fZ , p).
Proof. Consider Y = {(x, y, z) ∈ [0, 1]3 | z ≤ 1− x} and Z = {(x, y, z) ∈ [0, 1]3 |
z ≤ 1 − y} and the point p = (12 ,
1
2 ,
1
2 ). Let ε ∈ [0,
1
2 ], fX(p − (ε, 0, 0)) =
1
2 , so
lslope1(fX , p) = 0 and similarly lslope2(fX , p) = 0. However fY (p − (ε, 0, 0)) =
1
2 + ε, so lslope1(fY , p) = −1 and similarly lslope2(fZ , p) = −1.
This shows that the idea of following an accumulation point with the same
slope cannot be generalised easily to higher number of dimensions.
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